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Abstract 
International legal materials refer to “common but differentiated re-
sponsibility”, the “responsibility to protect”, or the “responsibility for 
the global economy”. These terms are manifestations of a single institu-
tion of international responsibility, which undergirds much interna-
tional law development since the 1990s. Institutions combine an idea 
and a legal reality. The idea of responsibility is that it establishes a rela-
tion between the vectors of moral agent, object, addressee to which the 
agent is accountable, and criteria of assessment.  
In the context of international law, states are the primary agents of 
responsibility, with international organisations being assigned secon-
dary responsibility. Accountability generally lies to the international 
community, acting through appropriate bodies which assess whether 
actors meet their assigned responsibility according to defined standards. 
This matrix of international responsibility is normatively guaranteed 
and concretised through an international law-making process that pro-
ceeds from the recognition in a non-binding document of responsibility 
as foundational principle for an area of law to the development of bind-
ing treaty law and alternative forms of international law-making. The 
thus conceptualised institution of international responsibility is then 
shown to manifest itself in three reference areas of international law: 
sustainable development, international financial markets, and state-
internal peace and stability including the Responsibility to Protect civil-
ians. The article concludes by drawing normative implications for the 
development and interpretation of international law that falls within the 
ambit of the institution of international responsibility. 
 
Keywords: Law of the Global Economy; International Responsibil-
ity; Institutions of International Law; International Law-making; Re-
sponsibility to Protect; Sustainable Development. 
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I. Introduction 
Responsibility has a bewildering array of senses or meanings each of 
which occupies a distinctive role.1 Historically, the term responsibility 
first appears in legal texts of the 15th century where responsibility re-
fers to the justification or defence of an action in court,2 and in the 19th 
century it denotes parliamentary ministerial responsibility to compen-
sate for the theory that the king is not responsible and therefore legally 
can do no wrong.3 For contemporary society responsibility is a key 
category of self-reflection which therein seeks reassurance after the loss 
of metaphysics and the end of utopian expectations of social progress.4 
Law shares the concept and terminology of responsibility with other 
disciplines such as philosophy and ethics,5 and (international) political 
theory.6 Responsibility plays, of course, an important role in legal phi-
losophy, albeit its account refers mostly to the domestic context. In 
positive legal theory responsibility is an established concept denoting 
mainly the consequences of individual action in torts and criminal law.7 
                                                          
1 J. Crawford/ J. Watkins, “International Responsibility”, in: J. Tasioulas/ S. 
Besson (eds), The Philosophy of International Law, 2010, 293 et seq. (here-
inafter Philosophy of International Law); D. Miller, National Responsibil-
ity and Global Justice, 2007, 82 et seq. (hereinafter National Responsibil-
ity). 
2 See W. Korff/ G. Wilhelms, “Verantwortung”, in: W. Kasper (ed.), Lexikon 
für Theologie und Kirche, 3rd edition, 2001, 600 et seq. 
3 Sir W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book III, Chapter XVII, available at 
<http://avalonlaw.yale.edu>; C. von Rotteck, “Lehrbuch der allgemeinen 
Staatslehre”, in: id., Lehrbuch des Vernunftrechts und der Staatswissen-
schaften, Vol. 2, 2nd edition, 1804, reprinted 1964, 249-251. 
4 M. Vogt, “Grenzen und Methoden der Verantwortung in der Risikogesell-
schaft”, in: J. Beaufort/ E. Gumpert/ M. Vogt (eds), Fortschritt und Risiko. 
Zur Dialektik der Verantwortung in (post-)moderner Gesellschaft, 2003, 85 
et seq.  
5 See e.g. H. Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility, 1985; F. Kaufmann, Der 
Ruf nach Verantwortung. Risiko und Ethik in einer unüberschaubaren 
Welt, 1992, 11 et seq. 
6 National Responsibility, see note 1. 
7 H.L.A. Hart, “Postscript: Responsibility and Retribution”, in: Punishment 
and Responsibility, 1968, 210 et seq.; G.P. Fletcher, “Punishment and Re-
sponsibility”, in: D. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law 
and Legal Theory, 1996, 514; J. Gardner, “The Mark of Responsibility”, 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 23 (2003), 157 et seq.; C. Kutz, “Responsi-
bility”, in: J. Coleman/ S. Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Juris-
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Responsibility has also been used in a political theory underpinning the 
legal relation between individual rights and their limitations in the pub-
lic interest which must be traceable to the objectives or public goods 
enshrined in a Constitution.8 Recent accounts of “international respon-
sibility” in the philosophy of international law put emphasis on moral 
responsibility as a yardstick for the law of state responsibility9 or more 
generally the instrumental value of the state.10  
Contemporary international law also makes a range of uses of the 
term responsibility. Here responsibility may denote a competence, as is 
the case for Article 24 UN Charter which provides that the UN Secu-
rity Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.”11 Responsibility may denote primary obli-
gations for states, for instance in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea,12 which is distinguishable from the use of the term responsi-
bility within the customary law of state responsibility concerned with 
secondary legal consequences attaching to the violation of states’ pri-
mary international law obligations.13 Responsibility may also denote 
                                                          
prudence and the Philosophy of Law, 2002, 548 et seq.; J. Raz, “Responsi-
bility and the Negligence Standard”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 
(2010), 1 et seq.  
8 R. Dworkin, “Hard cases”, in: Taking Rights Seriously, 1975, 88 et seq., see 
also T. Nagel, “Ruthlessness in Public Life”, in: Mortal Questions, 1979, 75 
et seq. 
9 Crawford/ Watkins, see note 1. 
10 L. Murphy, “International Responsibility”, in: Philosophy of International 
Law, see note 1, 299 et seq.  
11 See Security Council, Presidential Statement, SCOR 61st Sess., 6389th 
Mtg, Doc. S/PRST/2010/18 of 23 September 2010: “The Security Council 
reaffirms its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Na-
tions for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council 
in this regard recalls its resolutions and statements of its President in rela-
tion to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing.” 
12 “Responsibilities and Obligations of States sponsoring Persons and Entities 
with respect to Activities in the Area”, Sea-bed Disputes Chamber of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Case No. 17, Advisory 
Opinion of 1 February 2011 (hereinafter Responsibilities Opinion).  
13 Article 28 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, annexed to A/RES/56/83 of 12 December 2001, in: Report 
of the ILC, 53rd Sess., Doc. A/56/10 (hereinafter Articles on State Respon-
sibility). 
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individual criminal liability under international law.14 Concepts such as 
“the responsibility to protect” or “common but differentiated respon-
sibility” are finding their way into international law instruments. Re-
cent broader debates invoke responsibility in the sense of fundamental 
obligations of states, be it in respect of international terrorism15 or for 
the respect of fundamental human rights in other states.16 Finally, in the 
theory of organisation17 and of global administrative law18 responsibil-
ity is sometimes treated as a term for accountability. 
There is thus copious evidence of the importance of responsibility 
for the theory and practice of international law. But this only leaves the 
more pressing question as to what responsibility in international law 
means: is there a concept of responsibility of international law that 
overarches the terminological senses and debates? The search for a sin-
gle understanding of responsibility in international law requires one to 
realise that, seen from the perspective of law, responsibility – like justice 
– is not a quintessentially legal concept or term. It is rather a regulative 
principle that occupies a meta-level shared with other disciplines using 
identical terminology. From that meta-level law observes itself and 
makes strategic decisions about its relationship with other parts of soci-
ety. Just as justice remains the ultimate objective of law, responsibility 
marks the essence of any system of law. It constitutes its largely invisi-
                                                          
14 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law com-
mitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, arts 1, 7 and 
S/RES/827 (1993) of 25 May 1993. 
15 See T. Reinold, “State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-
Defense Post-9/11”, AJIL 105 (2011), 244 et seq. (responsibility in the 
sense of an obligation to prevent a state’s territory to be used by terrorists 
for launching attacks on another state). 
16 See M. Hakimi, “State Bystander Responsibility”, EJIL 21 (2010), 341 et 
seq. (responsibility to denote the obligation of a state in respect of another 
state’s human rights observation). 
17 See R.W. Grant/ R.O. Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in 
World Politics”, American Political Science Review 99 (2005), 35 et seq. 
(35-37); Y. Papadopoulos, “Problems of Democratic Accountability in 
Network and Multilevel Governance”, ELJ 13 (2007), 477 et seq. 
18 See R. Stewart, “Administrative Law for the 21st century”, N.Y.U.L. Rev. 
78 (2003), 437 et seq.; A.C. Aman, “The Limits of Globalization and the 
Future of Administrative Law: From Government to Governance”, Ind. J. 
Global Legal Stud. 8 (2001), 379 et seq. 
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ble foundational structure which may be rendered visible by means of 
legal principles.  
More precisely, responsibility is an institution. An institution is an 
idea or a set of ideas with the claim to constitute normative reality.19 In-
stitutions are not agents for the free production of legal norms. Rather 
law recognises institutions as necessary conditions for its normative 
contents. Institutions are law’s contact points with social reality. An in-
stitution requires convincing power on the level of ideas, it needs social 
recognition, and it depends on normative guarantees at all levels from 
principles through rule-making to concrete decisions of cases.20 Inter-
national law presupposes or reconfirms such institutions, integrating 
them with the international political system and assigning them func-
tions. The ICJ has recognised this for the institution of the self-
determination of peoples.21 The understanding of responsibility as an 
institution of international law will be substantiated subsequently in 
Part II. There then follow discussions of international responsibility in 
the reference contexts of sustainable development (Part III.), regulation 
of the global financial markets (Part IV.), and peace and stability within 
states (Part V.). Concluding that an institution of responsibility is em-
bedded in contemporary international law, Part VI. will clarify certain 
normative implications of that finding. 
II. Responsibility as an Institution of International Law 
Institutions couple an idea with a claim to normative reality. What is the 
idea of international responsibility and what are the mechanisms of the 
normative concretisation of this idea? 
                                                          
19 See U. Di Fabio, “Verantwortung als Verfassungsinstitut”, in: W. Knies 
(ed.), Staat, Amt, Verantwortung. Festschrift für Karl Fromme, 2002, 15 et 
seq. (20). 
20 Ibid., 15-40. 
21 See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Af-
rica in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Reports 1971, 16 et seq., para. 52 (hereinafter 
Namibia Opinion); Western Sahara, ICJ Reports 1975, 12 et seq. (31-33); 
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, 90 et seq. (102, para. 
29); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports 2004, 136 et seq. (171, para. 88) (herein-
after Wall Opinion) (from political concept to objective legal principle to 
subjective right with erga omnes-effect). 
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1. The Idea of International Responsibility 
The conceptual analysis of the idea of responsibility may start with the 
etymological insight that “responsibility” denotes linguistic interaction: 
answer-ability.22 At the heart of responsibility is indeed the idea of at-
tributing consequences and their control. Responsibility is thus rela-
tional. It marks the relation between subject (moral agent), object (ac-
tion or thing, moral patient), and a designated body (addressee) who 
disposes of effective sanctioning powers.23 Modern thinking presup-
poses that this addressee be legitimate and has criteria of assessment. All 
matters of responsibility play out within this matrix made up of the 
three vectors of who is responsible for what to whom.24 Responsibility 
is in particular the normative core of all public organisation in society, 
so that the art of organisation in essence becomes the art of the clear de-
limitation and attribution of responsibilities.25 That has long been ac-
cepted for the organisation of the constitutional state.26 But it is true 
also for the organisation of the international space above the state. The 
matrix of international responsibility then would consist of the follow-
ing three vectors: in respect of the question of who can be assigned with 
international responsibility, responsibility presupposes that there is 
space for own decision-making by the responsible actor. Only a compe-
tent actor can be said to be making decisions for which it and it alone is 
answerable. Responsibility and sovereignty thus imply each other.27 
Sovereignty under international law guarantees each state residual com-
petences for internal matters. For matters not under its jurisdiction, 
each state is competent to enter into cooperation with other states and 
to implement the results of that cooperation domestically. The sover-
eign veil can be pierced and responsibility be attributed to state organs, 
namely regulators. It is also within the logic of the idea of responsibility 
that it reaches further down into the state. Thus, individuals running a 
                                                          
22 J.R. Lucas, Responsibility, 1993, 5 et seq. 
23 Vogt, see note 4, 89. 
24 O. Höffe, Moral als Preis der Moderne, 1993, 23. 
25 K. Bayertz, Verantwortung. Prinzip oder Problem?, 1995, 43. 
26 Cf. Di Fabio, see note 19, 20-40; L. Fisler Damrosch, “War and Uncer-
tainty. (On Democratic Ground: New Perspectives on John Hart Ely)”, 
Yale L. J. 114 (2005), 1405 et seq. 
27 See F.M. Deng/ S. Kimaro/ T. Lyons/ D. Rothchild/ I.W. Zartman, Sover-
eignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, 1996, 1 et seq. 
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state’s government can bear international (criminal) responsibility.28 
States are, however, not the exclusive competent actors and therefore 
subjects of responsibility in the international sphere. That role can also 
be played by international organisations and their organs if and where 
competences have been conferred upon them,29 or by other forms of in-
stitutionalised cooperation between states to the extent that they exer-
cise formal or informal public authority.30 But to the extent that private 
conduct is of consequence at the international level it becomes possible 
to attribute consequences of private action for an international public 
good. Assigning them with responsibility renders the private parties ac-
countable at the international level to a designated body. At the level of 
the implementation of this individual or private responsibility, there is 
then the need to respect the applicable human or other individual 
rights.  
What can international responsibility be assigned for? This denotes 
the remit of responsibility: the public good for which responsibility is 
assigned, and the questions of whether conduct or omission are relevant 
and whether responsibility is to be attributed for the past or the future. 
Primary and secondary responsibilities among relevant actors have to 
be clearly identified. The remit of an actor’s responsibility is determined 
on the basis of norms. Such norms are shaped particularly by interna-
tional law whose structure ensures that the duties of responsible actors 
can be determined in a practical manner.31 This does not exclude that in 
                                                          
28 Rome Statute of the ICC, arts 25, 27, UNTS Vol. 2187 No. 38544. On ag-
gression within the meaning of article 5 (1)(d) Statute of the ICC as a lead-
ership crime see C. Kreß/ L. von Holtzendorff, “The Kampala Compro-
mise on the Crime of Aggression”, Journal of International Criminal Jus-
tice 8 (2010), 1179 et seq. (1189). By contrast, the once hotly discussed 
criminal responsibility of states has been largely dropped, see D. Bo-
dansky/ J.R. Crook, “Symposium: The ILC’s State Responsibility Arti-
cles”, AJIL 96 (2002), 772 et seq. (784).  
29 The UN Charter uses responsibility in this sense of competence in many of 
its stipulations on the principal organs, cf. Arts 13 (2), 60 for the General 
Assembly; Arts 24 (1), 26 for the Security Council; Article 60 for 
ECOSOC. 
30 See A. von Bogdandy et al. (eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by In-
ternational Institutions, 2009. 
31 See generally P. Weil, “Towards Relative Normativity in International 
Law?”, AJIL 77 (1983), 413 et seq. (functions and qualities of international 
law norms). 
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certain instances standards may reach into the political sphere.32 Inter-
national responsibility first presupposes that an international public 
good which lies in the interest of the international community as a 
whole can be identified. There is no fixed or predetermined list of such 
international goods, their identification is the province of the interna-
tional political and legal systems as is the attribution of responsibility 
for them. Conceptually, there are two categories of international public 
goods: there are public goods that require international cooperation and 
those that are the subject of internal action. Sustainable development 
and regulation of the global economy are such international goods in 
need of cooperative action by all or most states, while lawful peace and 
security are state internal matters. 
In respect of such goods, each state will be responsible for reflecting 
on the objectives as well as the design of the regulation and organisation 
to achieve these objectives. Since each state owns this responsibility 
none can cede control either over the process of reflection or over the 
implementation of the results of the reflections, including any interna-
tional organisation that may be founded or resorted to in the further-
ance of the common objective.33 If the cooperation extends into the fu-
ture, in other words if it is a programme rather than a one-off event, 
then the reflective responsibility extends over time. This will comprise 
all points of the process of negotiating, entering into and complying 
with internationally legally binding commitments. Reflective responsi-
bility entails a strong element of discretion in the design of the coopera-
tive mechanisms. But the design of cooperation is subject to certain 
substantive standards relating to effectiveness, equity, and transparency. 
The cooperative design would namely have to provide for a clear identi-
                                                          
32 This concentration on responsibility criteria distinguishes the institution of 
responsibility from broader accountability theories such as those put for-
ward by M. Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability: A 
Conceptual Framework”, European Law Review 13 (2007), 447 et seq. 
(450); see also M. Bovens/ D. Curtin/ P.T. Hart (eds), Studying the Real 
World of EU Accountability: Framework and Design in the Real World of 
EU Accountability – What Deficit?, 2010, 35 et seq. 
33 Cf. Joined cases 2 BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 
BvR 1259/08, 2 BvR 182/09, Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 
BVerfGE 123, 267, see also for a translation under 
<www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen> (on the constitution-
ality of the EU Treaty of Lisbon, discussing reflective “konzeptionelle” re-
sponsibility of the European Union Member States and the principle of 
conferred powers on the European Union) (hereinafter Lisbon judgment). 
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fication of primary and secondary responsibilities among relevant ac-
tors, shaping the demarcation of the obligations of states and the com-
petences of international organisations. But there are also international 
public goods relating to matters under the jurisdiction of each state. 
Neither international or supranational organisations nor other states 
can displace the sovereign in its responsibility for regulating these mat-
ters in line with international standards.34 Yet responsibility may come 
to be recognised to additionally lie with other international actors, as 
responsibility to guarantee or to act. As a consequence, again the need 
arises to define the concomitant obligations, rights and competences of 
all actors. 
Responsibility always lies towards another body. Responsibility 
necessarily implies a hierarchical relationship of the responsible actor 
with the designated body to which accountability lies. Acting for the 
international community, an organisation such as the United Nations 
can fulfil the role of the designated body to which the responsible actor 
is accountable. A state’s international responsibility implies account-
ability to a designated international body competent to set standards 
for the conduct of states, assess each state’s performance against them 
and sanction its findings. Accountability in this sense includes that the 
institution to which accountability lies has effective sanctions at its dis-
posal, in other words powers of compliance control. The consequences 
of responsibility must be defined. Mere factual results of own action or 
omission cannot be accounted for as sanction. International responsibil-
ity is attributed in the interest of the international community.35 Inter-
national responsibility is not a single issue topic confined to one area of 
law. Rather this institution sits at a medium level of generality, extend-
ing over a range of subject areas of that segment or “layer”36 of interna-
                                                          
34 Retaining such competence may be demanded in constitutional law as a 
precondition for effective democratic responsibility, cf. Lisbon judgment. 
Accordingly Member States have not transferred certain critical compe-
tences to the European Union, not even through the Lisbon Treaty. 
35 According to arts 42 (b), 48 (1)(b) Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, see note 13, states have certain obligations 
to the “international community as a whole”, giving legal form to the rec-
ognition and safeguarding of collective goods. For the term international 
community as a whole see Commentaries, article 25, para. 18; J.R. Craw-
ford, “Responsibilities of the International Community as a Whole”, Ind. 
J. Global Legal Stud. 8 (2000-01), 303 et seq. (314-315). 
36 See J.H.H. Weiler, “The Geology of International Law – Governance, De-
mocracy and Legitimacy”, ZaöRV/ HJIL 64 (2004), 556 et seq. 
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tional law that advances wider community objectives and harnesses the 
state.37  
It is then clear how international responsibility can be distinguished 
from state responsibility and other forms of liability in international 
law.38 Assigning actors with responsibility will often result in the estab-
lishment of primary obligations for them. Liability then expresses the 
idea that a legally defined consequence attaches to the violation of a 
primary obligation incumbent on the responsible agent. Liability may 
be institutionalised in different ways,39 and in international law it is ex-
pressed as the customary law of state responsibility as well as the often 
treaty-based liability with or without fault in international law and it 
will often include the occurrence of damages. Liability may be estab-
lished for public goods, the safeguard of which lies in the interest of the 
international community as a whole. States are liable for consequences 
resulting from their own action, and that may include a lack of supervi-
sion of private actors. Responsibility and liability as two different 
senses of the term responsibility are both in operation in the interna-
tional legal system but at different stages.40  
2. Guaranteeing International Responsibility Law 
The institution of international responsibility depends on normative 
guarantees at all levels from principles through rule-making down to 
concrete decisions. In the decentralised international law context such 
guarantees cannot be derived from a single constitution – in the sense of 
a document at the apex of a normative hierarchy. In a world of sover-
                                                          
37 See E. Hey, “International Public Law”, International Law Forum 6 
(2004), 149 et seq. 
38 Conceptual clarity is particularly in demand in international law which 
may tend to use responsibility as synonymous for liability, Crawford/ 
Watkins, see note 1, 284. 
39 Such as censure in public law, punishment in criminal law, liability in pri-
vate law. 
40 Cf. Crawford/ Watkins, see note 1, 284 (referring for responsibility to judi-
cial process). In reality, the structure of primary substantive responsibility-
related obligations and the corresponding legal interest to invoke them is 
also relevant at the level of enforcing liability, see Responsibilities Opinion, 
see note 12, para. 180 (erga omnes obligation for states to protect the ma-
rine environment of the Area means that all states may claim compensation 
for damage to that environment). 
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eigns, what rather matters is the ability of states dynamically to produce 
authoritative texts on international responsibility along the matrix out-
lined above. Guaranteeing international responsibility is thus intimately 
wedded to the contemporary process of international law-making. This 
process is grounded in foundational political documents, which serve as 
reference points for subsequent law-making encompassing instruments 
ranging from treaty law to alternative forms of law-making including 
administrative-style rule-making. The process has been powerfully elu-
cidated by the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea in the recent Advisory Opinion on Responsibili-
ties and Obligations of States sponsoring Persons and Entities with Re-
spect to Activities in the Area.41 The Chamber there discusses the “pre-
cautionary principle”, linking it to the Rio Declaration. The politically 
binding Rio Declaration, so the Chamber finds, is the starting point for 
a process of concretising this principle into binding law. There could be 
several forms of legal implementation in the law of the sea, ranging 
from the treaties to the secondary law of rules adopted by the Interna-
tional Sea-bed Authority.42 The cumulative effect of concretising of the 
principle through treaty or sub-treaty norms could then cause the prin-
ciple to crystallise in customary international law.43 The Chamber thus 
identifies a cascading process that allows moving from the first re-
cognition of a broad principle in a politically binding document to the 
legally binding concretisation of the rationale underlying the principle. 
The same concretisation process is available for international responsi-
bility.44 The process takes as its starting point a foundational document 
which for a new area under consideration first adopts the terminology 
of responsibility and assigns relevant actors with responsibilities. This 
                                                          
41 See note 12. On the position of the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea within the Law of the Sea Convention’s dispute settlement system 
and the broader international regime for the settlement of disputes see B.H. 
Oxman, “A Tribute to Louis Sohn – Is the Dispute Settlement System un-
der the Law of the Sea Convention Working?, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 39 
(2007), 655 et seq. (656-659). 
42 Responsibilities Opinion, see note 12, paras 126-35, 161.  
43 In the event, the Chamber found that the environmental impact assessment 
requirement was customary international law, Responsibilities Opinion, 
see note 12, para. 145, while the precautionary principle was (only) 
launched on the way to becoming customary international law, para. 135. 
44 Regardless of the fact that the idea of responsibility is situated at a higher 
level of abstraction than the more specific environmental principles featur-
ing in the Responsibilities Opinion. 
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foundational document will be of a non-binding political nature. The 
document of universal or near universal acceptability is then concre-
tised through binding international law. Such binding law can be treaty 
law, secondary law adopted by international organisations, or alterna-
tive forms of international law-making. The collective self-attribution 
of responsibility by states is rooted in the consent principle that tradi-
tionally underpins the legitimacy of international law. But responsibil-
ity may also be attributed by a group of states to third states. The con-
sent principle cannot legitimise responsibility attribution to a non-
consenting state. Such external responsibility attribution can, however, 
derive legitimation from the group of states claiming to be acting in the 
interest of the international community. This presupposes that these 
states constitute a representative group of states which includes those 
most interested in the matter and that there is an objective justification 
for also attributing responsibility to the non-represented state. The 
creation of responsibility related norms of international law is thus in 
essence a deductive process. This differentiates it from the other well-
established categories of public-interest norms in international law: ius 
cogens and erga omnes norms both develop essentially inductively 
through converging state practice.  
III. Responsibility for Sustainable Development 
The article will now turn to examining the law of sustainable develop-
ment as reference area for the institution of responsibility. Sustainable 
development is by now an established branch of international law. The 
1992 Rio Declaration is its foundational text, grounding it in the idea of 
responsibility. The Rio Declaration has then been concretised in the in-
ternational legal regimes on the global commons, namely the climate 
and the oceans along the matrix of responsibility. 
1. Responsibility in the Rio Declaration 
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 produced as a central outcome the Rio 
Declaration.45 The non-binding Rio Declaration has become the foun-
                                                          
45 Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
Declaration, Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Vol.1 of 12 August 1992. 
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dational document of sustainable development law by setting forth its 
principles.46 In particular, the Rio Declaration bases international ef-
forts at achieving sustainable development on the idea of responsibility 
in its Principles No. 1, 2 and 7. Rio Principle No. 1 sets out sustainable 
development as an objective or public good and identifies humanity as a 
chief beneficiary of international efforts undertaken in pursuit of this 
objective.47 Taken together, Rio Principles No. 2 and 7 break down the 
objective of sustainable development into the matrix of responsibilities: 
Principle No. 2 establishes the responsibility of each state for matters 
under its jurisdiction. The Principle does so by pairing the sovereign 
right of each state to exploit its own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies with the “responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction.”48 Principle No. 7 is then concerned with de-
fining the concomitant responsibility of each state for global ecosys-
tems. The Principle introduces “common but differentiated responsi-
bilities” of states for sustainable development in the following terms: 
“States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, 
protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. 
In view of the different contributions to global environmental deg-
radation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities. The 
developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in 
the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the 
technologies and financial resources they command.”(emphasis 
added) 
                                                          
46 On the principles of international environmental law see J. Brunnée, “The 
Stockholm Declaration and the Structure and Processes of International 
Environmental Law”, in: A. Chircop/ T. McDorman (eds), Future of 
Ocean Regime Building: Essays in Tribute to D.M. Johnston, 2008, 41 et 
seq.; P. Birnie/A. Boyle/ C. Redgwell, International Law and the Envi-
ronment, 3rd edition, 2009, 181 et seq. (hereinafter International Law and 
the Environment); P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental 
Law, 1995, 181 et seq. 
47 Principle No. 1: “Human Beings are at the centre of concerns for sustain-
able development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in 
harmony with nature.” 
48 Identical to Principle No. 21 of the Stockholm Declaration of the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment 1972, but for adding “develop-
mental” policies. 
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While there is no shortage of voices in the literature discussing the 
theoretical49 and practical50 relevance of common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities for international sustainable development law, Rio Princi-
ple No. 7 is best understood as founding the international protection of 
the global environment on the idea of responsibility. Principle No. 7 es-
tablishes as a public good the protection of global ecosystems as an es-
sential part of sustainable development. Recognition of the causal link 
between human-induced pressures and current trends in environmental 
degradation is the ground for assigning states with the responsibility for 
cooperative action to protect the global environment and achieve sus-
tainable development. This responsibility is common to all states and 
thus it is attributed to each state. It comprises the responsibility to re-
flect on the design of a regime for the world’s ecosystems and to assume 
duties under the thus designed regime. In a second step, both higher 
pressures and higher capacities and financial resources ground attribut-
ing special or greater responsibility to developed states within the co-
operative design. 
There are also standards that any such design has to meet so that it 
will be effective51 and reflective of burden-sharing between developed 
and developing states in line with equity and capacity. Principle No. 7 is 
concerned with the past, present and future impact and the present and 
future capacity of states. That implies that the qualification of a state as 
developed or developing is only a proxy for the actual impact on the 
environment and the remedial capacity of each state at any given mo-
ment in time. The Rio Declaration itself contains further indications of 
the differentiated treatment accorded to developed and developing 
states. For instance, by stating that the precautionary approach shall be 
applied by states “according to their capabilities”, the first sentence of 
Principle No. 15 introduces the possibility of differences in application 
of the precautionary approach in light of the different capabilities of 
each state.52 The Rio Declaration thus puts the idea of responsibility at 
                                                          
49 Cf. C.D. Stone, “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in Interna-
tional Law”, AJIL 98 (2004), 276 et seq. (276-81) with E.A. Posner/ C.R. 
Sunstein, “Climate Change Justice”, Geo. L. J. 96 (2008), 1565 et seq. 
(1565-1607). 
50 International Law and the Environment, see note 46, 132-36. 
51 “conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s eco-
system.” 
52 Principle No. 15: “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scien-
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the heart of sustainable development governance. The non-binding 
Declaration drives the process of developing binding international law. 
What follows is an analysis of the legal regimes concerned with global 
climate (see below under 2.) and the oceans (see below under 3.), each 
striving for universal membership, and of the way they concretise 
common but differentiated responsibilities.53  
2. The Climate Change Regime 
Spawned at UNCED, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (FCCC) recognises that climate change is indeed a “com-
mon concern of humankind” necessitating international cooperative ac-
tion.54 The FCCC, in its arts 3 and 4, incorporates Rio Principle No. 7 
into the climate change regime, giving it legal force. Article 3 (1) FCCC 
essentially restates Principle No. 7 for the climate change context,55 and 
article 4 FCCC further concretises article 3 by creating two categories 
of obligations, those common to all Parties and those incumbent on de-
veloped Parties as defined by Annex I only.56 Arts 3, 4 of the FCCC 
concretise Rio Principle No. 7 along the matrix of responsibility identi-
fied above. There is recognition of the causal link between anthropo-
genic carbon dioxide emissions and current trends in global warming 
which grounds the need and responsibility for climate protection 
through binding international law. Humanity is the ultimate beneficiary 
                                                          
tific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.” 
53 Elements of differentiated treatment of developed and developing countries 
can be found in a number of international environmental law treaties. For a 
comprehensive account see L. Rajamani, Differential Treatment in Interna-
tional Environmental Law, 2006. 
54 Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNTS Vol. 1771 No. 30822, 
Preamble (hereinafter FCCC). 
55 FCCC article 3 (1): “[t]he Parties should protect the climate system for the 
benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of eq-
uity and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof.” The formula of article 3 FCCC or elements thereof are also in-
corporated in supplemental climate-change instruments adopted subse-
quently. The Preamble of the Kyoto Protocol declares the Parties to the 
Protocol as being guided by article 3 FCCC. 
56 FCCC article 4 (2)(f) provides that the list of States Parties contained in 
Annex I is open to amendment by the COP. 
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of such protection efforts, but accountability of each State Party lies 
with the States Parties organised within the Conference of the Parties 
(COP). Each State Party is responsible for cooperative climate protec-
tion, both through collectively reflecting on its governance and through 
the readiness to undertake individual measures. Differentiated emis-
sions, respective capabilities and equity mean that responsibility for 
protective measures should differentiate between developing and devel-
oped States Parties.57 
Developed States Parties thus have heightened or leadership responsi-
bility to bring about this framework through their continuous readiness 
to take the necessary measures on the basis of legally binding obliga-
tions. The practice of States Parties shows, through the FCCC itself and 
then through the subsequent supplementing agreements, largely com-
porting with this matrix, that they have collectively been reflecting on a 
regime of climate protection (a), which corresponds with the substan-
tive standards inherent in the formula of common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities (b). 
a. The Common Responsibility of Each State Party: Reflective 
Responsibility 
The responsibility to be engaged in reflecting on climate protection as a 
cooperative enterprise is common to all Parties, regardless of their 
status as enshrined under the FCCC or any Protocol to it. Article 2 
FCCC establishes how States Parties to the Convention intend to exer-
cise their reflective responsibility. Article 2 provides that the Conven-
tion’s ultimate objective of stabilising “greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system” will be achieved through the 
adoption of “this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt.” Climate protection, then, is con-
ceived of as a matter of progressively developing instruments that are 
legally binding or that have at least an equivalent effect.  
                                                          
57 See Proceedings of the 96th Annual Mtg of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, “Common but Differentiated Responsibility”, ASIL Pro-
ceedings 96 (2002), 358 et seq. (358) (remarks of C.C. Joyner) (industrial-
ised countries are responsible for the majority of these emissions, and thus 
the FCCC excludes developing countries from binding emissions reduc-
tions requirements). 
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The FCCC itself is designed as framework convention. As such, it 
sets out broad principles for the protection of the global climate but not 
firm legal commitments. These are to be set out in subsequent Proto-
cols to the Convention (article 17 FCCC). Since it is for the COP to 
adopt any such supplemental instruments, each state must be involved 
in the design of the instruments and each state is accountable for that 
design as well as its readiness to adopt the instrument.  
States have adhered to and refined this concept through successive 
stages of designing instruments. The Parties to the FCCC supple-
mented it with the Kyoto Protocol.58 This treaty sets forth firm, quanti-
fied and timetabled emissions reduction commitments for Annex I 
States Parties. The Kyoto Protocol also contains a conceptual innova-
tion in providing for economically efficient climate change protection 
through the Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms.59 There is compliance 
control through administrative means elaborated by legislative-type de-
cisions of the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties. The Kyoto 
Protocol’s commitments will expire in 2012. States Parties to the FCCC 
have identified the need for agreeing on a successor regime in the Bali 
Plan of Action adopted in 2007.60 The non-binding Bali Plan of Action 
sets forth substantive parameters for the future regime, namely in that it 
provides for mitigation and adaptation measures, the continuation of 
the flexibility mechanisms and a special fund for the support of climate 
protection projects in developing countries.61 It also institutes two 
open-ended negotiating processes under the FCCC and under the 
Kyoto Protocol,62 with the participation of all states.63 These processes 
                                                          
58 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, UNTS Vol. 2303 No. 30822 (hereinafter Kyoto Protocol). 
59 See I.H. Rowlands, “Atmosphere and Outer Space”, in: D. Bodansky/ J. 
Brunnée/ E. Hey (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Environmental 
Law, 2006, 315 et seq. (330-331) (hereinafter Handbook). 
60 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 13th Sess., Bali, 3-15 December 2007, Decision 
1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 of 14 March 
2008) (hereinafter Bali Action Plan). 
61 For industrialised states, the Bali Action Plan contemplates “[n]ationally 
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emis-
sion limitation and reduction objectives, ...” whereas for developing coun-
tries it envisages only “[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions ....”, Bali 
Action Plan, see note 60, para. 1(b)(i)-(ii). 
62 The AWG-LCA held its first session in March 2008, United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc Working Group on 
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led first to the political compromise of the so-called Copenhagen Ac-
cord that States Parties “took note of”64 which was then the basis for 
the agreement reached at the meeting of the COP in Cancun.65 The 
Cancun COP adopted a decision that sets forth the parameters of the 
post-Kyoto regime.66 There will be mitigation and adaptation and there 
will be a green fund. Annex I Parties are expected to communicate their 
intended emissions reduction commitments for the period after 2012 on 
an individual basis to the COP through its Subsidiary Body on Scien-
tific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). Non-Annex I Parties under-
take to communicate their Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action 
to the COP. Communications are formally recognised by the COP. 
These communications to the COP are not legally binding. But some-
thing equivalent is being achieved. Because communications are being 
made to the COP as the representative “supreme” body of the FCCC, 
each State Party is thereby recognising that the COP can hold it ac-
countable for its targets. This is political accountability in the sense that 
the instance to which accountability lies can take political sanctions to 
express its sentiment as to whether negotiating standards of good faith 
have been fulfilled. The complementary decision adopted by the COP 
serving as the meeting of the Parties for the Kyoto-Protocol provides 
this. As a result of the Cancun Accord there is a subtle change in the 
structure of commitments that now resemble the individually negoti-
ated and agreed schedules of commitments by means of which WTO 
                                                          
Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, First Sess., Bang-
kok, 1 March - 8 April 2008. For documentation see <http://unfccc.int/ 
meetings> 
63 Views Regarding the Work Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Doc. 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/MISC.1 of 3 March 2008, see under <http:// 
unfccc.int>. See J. Brunnée, “From BALI to Copenhagen: Towards a 
Shared Vision for a Post-2012 Climate Regime?”, Maryland Journal of In-
ternational Law 25 (2010), 86 et seq. 
64 Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 15th Sess., 7-18 December 2009, Copenhagen, Draft 
Decision/CP 15; Proposal by the President, Copenhagen Accord (hereinaf-
ter Copenhagen Accord), Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 of 18 December 2009, 
see under <http://unfccc.int>. 
65 See D. Bodansky, “The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Post-
mortem”, AJIL 104 (2010), 230 et seq.; L. Rajamani, “The Making and 
Unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord”, ICLQ 59 (2010), 824 et seq. 
66 L. Rajamani, “The Cancun Climate Agreements: Reading the Text, Subtext 
and Tea Leaves”, ICLQ 60 (2011), 499 et seq. 
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Member States bind their tariffs and other obstacles to trade in goods or 
services.  
Subsequent state practice has thus confirmed the three essential ele-
ments of article 2 FCCC: the establishment of a process of negotiating 
instruments that have legal or equivalent effect, the continuing in-
volvement of each State Party in it, and the role of the COP as account-
ability addressee of each State Party. Through their practice States Par-
ties have not only confirmed but further elaborated the original concep-
tion set out in article 2 FCCC. Evidence of that is the move from state 
group based greenhouse gas reduction commitments in the Kyoto-
Protocol to the individual communications foreseen in the Cancun de-
cisions. Reflective responsibility has thus resulted in states renouncing 
the hitherto established one-off approach of elaborating a treaty and 
then applying it. Instead law-making on the climate has become an it-
erative process passing through characteristic stages. This process has 
aptly been labelled a “convention-cum-protocol approach.”67 The first 
stage is a multilateral law-making treaty in the form of a framework 
convention, which sets out broad principles and objectives. Subse-
quently, States Parties are to be guided by these objectives and princi-
ples in defining more specific obligations. States’ law-development re-
sponsibility then translates into a responsibility to respect the law 
agreed at relevant intervals. But the underlying law-development re-
sponsibilities remain active and come to the fore again at the end of the 
period of time covered by the treaty. Discharge of their continuous re-
flective responsibility then requires states to enter into negotiations 
with a view to drawing up a successor instrument. All States Parties are 
responsible for entering into and conducting negotiations through the 
multilateral process under the FCCC. That does not exclude the raising 
of climate change matters in other near-fora, but decision-making ought 
to be left to the inclusive UN process. Negotiations must be conducted 
in good faith, which, as a minimum, requires that constructive efforts 
must be undertaken to develop negotiating positions on the issues that 
each state considers critical.68 Reflective responsibility implies that 
                                                          
67 P. Sand, “The Evolution of International Environmental Law”, in: Hand-
book, see note 59, 29, 35 et seq.; D. Bodansky, “The Framework Conven-
tion/Protocol Approach”, in: Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
Technical Briefing Services, 1999. 
68 The ICJ first devised an obligation to negotiate in good faith in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Reports 1969, 3 et seq. (para. 85). Case 
concerning Application of the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federa-
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States Parties remain ready to adapt or modify regulatory techniques if 
need be. 
b. Differentiated Responsibilities of States Parties: Standards for 
Outcomes 
As shown above, already Rio Principle No. 7 makes clear that common 
but differentiated responsibilities also enunciate substantive standards 
as to effectiveness and burden-sharing that the climate protection re-
gime has to comply with. Article 2 FCCC establishes a negotiating re-
sponsibility for all States Parties. The outcome of that negotiated proc-
ess is only vaguely determined, i.e. the human induced temperature rise 
must remain manageable. In addition, it must reflect regard for the sci-
entific consensus on the underlying threats to the global commons.69 
The critical standard is the differentiated responsibilities which must re-
flect the differentiated capacities for contribution to climate change and 
for the fight against it. Under article 3 (1) FCCC, differentiation of the 
burden to be shouldered by states for the protection of the climate 
needs to take place on the basis of responsibility understood as causa-
tion70 and capacities or financial resources to take remedial action. To 
this has been added the explicit consideration of equity, which relates to 
the allocation of climate protection efforts between developed and de-
                                                          
tion), Judgment of 1 April 2011, paras 122-184, available at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/16398.pdf>, has clarified that 
good faith requires a state, as a minimum, transparently to raise the issues it 
considers important. The reasoning of the Court in the case applied to set-
tling disputes under a convention peacefully through negotiations prior to 
its seisin, but may be taken to reflect the structure of any good faith obliga-
tion to negotiate in international law. 
69 The normative basis is article 1 (2) FCCC which establishes the causal link 
between anthropogenic emissions and the resulting climate change. This 
science based analysis of the problem leads to informed solutions based on 
or at least informed by science. See R.K. Pachauri et al. (eds), Climate 
Change, 2007: Synthesis Report, 66-67, Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change, 2007, available at <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report> 
70 See National Responsibility, see note 1, 83-90 (discussing the role of estab-
lishing causation for identifying responsibility for a given situation – out-
come responsibility – as opposed to assigning responsibility for dealing 
with it – remedial responsibility). 
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veloping states.71 This results in a rough dividing line between develop-
ing and developed countries. The attribution of primary (“leadership”) 
responsibility to developed States Parties yields their accountability not 
just for internal mitigation and adaptation action as internationally 
agreed but also for support for emission reduction efforts in developing 
States Parties. The assumption underlying differential or secondary re-
sponsibility of developing countries is that they lack relevant capacity 
both in respect of emitting greenhouse gases and in respect of mitigat-
ing any such emissions. It is for this critical assumption that there are 
no quantitative emission reduction obligations imposed on them. This 
would point to a duty for each State Party to evaluate, in good faith, on 
which side of the dividing line between developing and developed states 
it falls at the precise moment of negotiations. 
Practice of states conforms to this principle. Article 3 (1) FCCC en-
shrines the common but differentiated responsibilities for climate 
change, and article 4 FCCC introduces distinct categories of States Par-
ties as Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Higher standards of con-
duct are explicitly set for Annex I (developed) states, both in the FCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol supplementing it. The Kyoto Protocol imple-
ments the idea of differentiated responsibility by establishing time-
tabled and quantified emission reduction commitments for Annex I 
States Parties only. States Parties other than Annex I countries have a 
much diminished but still relevant complimentary responsibility to play 
in the development and operation of viable climate change. That catego-
risation as an Annex I or non-Annex I State Party at the time of the 
adoption of the FCCC is a proxy as the underlying principle of capabil-
ity only is reflected in that the Annexes are open to amendment by the 
COP.72 More forcefully, the Bali Plan uses the more flexible categories 
of developed and developing states73 and the Cancun decisions allow 
                                                          
71 This is neither distributive nor corrective justice. But see Posner/ Sunstein, 
see note 49, 1583, 1591. 
72 See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, Request from a Group of Countries of Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova regarding their Status under 
the Convention, Decision 35/CP.7, Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4 of 21 
January 2002, page 25.  
73 Bali Action Plan, see note 60, para. 1 (b)(i)-(ii); see Brunnée, see note 63, 
101; C. Spence et al., “Great Expectations: Understanding Bali and the 
Climate Change Negotiation Process”, RECIEL 17 (2008), 142 et seq. 
(150). 
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the underlying rationale to play out even more forcefully by providing 
for individual communications from all developing states as well.74  
3. The Rio Declaration and the Law of the Sea 
Rio Principle No. 7 allows for context-specific implementation as long 
as the main conceptual planks of the principle are maintained. The im-
plementation of the principle of common but differentiated responsi-
bilities in the Rio-spawned regime on the global climate has been dis-
cussed above. This regime relies on multilateral law-making treaties. 
The global commons of the oceans are also subject to a multilateral law-
making treaty in the form of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea.75 While the LOS Convention predates the Rio Declaration, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has not hesitated to refer 
to the Rio Declaration as a conceptual starting point for understanding 
the Convention.76 The Convention can therefore be considered as an 
instantiation of the Rio Declaration principles and common but differ-
entiated responsibilities.77 Referred to as a “constitution for the 
oceans”78 in the sense that it comprehensively covers all ocean uses, the 
Convention instantiates its vision of common but differentiated respon-
sibilities of States Parties in particular in the regulation of the explora-
tion and exploitation of the mineral resources of the sea-bed per Part 
                                                          
74 On the evidence of the communications received so far there is a differen-
tiation within the group of Non-Annex I Parties between the more and the 
less developed states. China, in particular, has communicated a substantial 
policy commitment. See Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice, Compilation of Economy-Wide Emission Reduction Targets to be 
Implemented by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, Doc. 
FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1 of 10 March 2011. 
75 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNTS Vol. 1834 No. 
31363 (hereinafter UNCLOS or LOS Convention). 
76 Responsibilities Opinion, see note 12, para. 125. 
77 See C.D. Stone, “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in Interna-
tional Law”, AJIL 98 (2004), 276 et seq. (276) speaking of “close cognates” 
to common but differentiated responsibilities. 
78 T. Koh, The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, 1983, xxxiii. 
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XI UNLCOS and the 1994 Implementation Agreement relating to Part 
XI UNCLOS.79 80 
Such mining activity of potentially high economic interest would by 
necessity implicate the sensitive marine environment of the deep sea. 
The LOS Convention contains a fundamental principle of the protec-
tion of the marine environment.81 In order to protect the marine envi-
ronment of the deep sea-bed the Convention establishes “responsibili-
ties” for states when engaging in mining. Responsibility thus appears as 
a legal term in several provisions of Part XI UNCLOS. The structure of 
these provisions has been clarified by the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber of 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in its Responsibilities 
Advisory Opinion.82 The Chamber found that these provisions must be 
seen as enshrining primary obligations for states in the interest of the 
protection of the marine environment, not secondary obligations within 
the meaning of the law of state responsibility.83 States are under direct 
obligations for their own conduct. They also have indirect obligations 
for the conduct of private parties (undertakings) wishing to explore or 
exploit the area whereby states need not just to “sponsor” and thus 
control the private parties but also have the obligation to take appropri-
ate legislative action in the national legal orders to control private ac-
tion. The obligation involved is substantively a due diligence obligation 
in the sense that there is no prescribed or finite measure to be taken but 
that standards depend on the circumstances and are subject to evolu-
tion.84 It includes everything that is comprised by the direct obligations 
a state is under, namely the implementation of the precautionary ap-
                                                          
79 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, UNTS Vol. 
1836 No. 31364. 
80 See E. Posner/ A.O. Sykes, “Economic Foundations of the Law of the 
Sea”, AJIL 114 (2010), 569 et seq. (587-588) (summary of the state of the 
law resulting from Part XI UNCLOS and the 1994 Implementation 
Agreement). 
81 “… the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of 
pollution of the marine environment”, Case No. 10, The Mox Plant Case 
(Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, para. 82, ITLOS 3 De-
cember 2001; Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and 
around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Provisional Measures, 
para. 92, ITLOS 8 October 2003. 
82 Responsibilities Opinion, see note 12. 
83 Responsibilities Opinion, ibid., paras 64-71, 107-116. 
84 Responsibilities Opinion, ibid., paras 117-120. 
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proach and best environmental practices.85 These direct and indirect ob-
ligations are incumbent on all states – both developed and developing – 
that choose to engage in sponsoring exploration and exploitation of the 
mineral resources of the deep sea-bed to the same degree. They are im-
posed in the interest of mankind.86 Differential treatment of developing 
countries for the protection of the marine environment is indeed only 
possible to a very limited extent as equality of treatment for all states 
sponsoring activities in the area is essential to prevent regulatory arbi-
trage (“sponsor states of convenience”) being harmful to the protection 
of the environment of the deep sea. But developing states receive special 
access rights to the mining activities that the International Sea-bed Au-
thority itself will be undertaking for the benefit of mankind.87 Also, de-
veloped states should support developing states through provision of 
training.88 
The regime for the Area enshrined in Part XI UNCLOS and the 
1994 Implementation Agreement thus concretises common but differ-
entiated responsibilities of States Parties for the protection of the ma-
rine environment of the deep sea-bed. Each state engaging in mining in 
the Area is assigned with the responsibility to protect the marine envi-
ronment. In remarkable distinction from the climate change regime, 
primary environmental protection obligations of states are not differen-
tiated in any significant measure. Rather developed and developing 
states are under more or less the same stringent obligations, and there is 
the same accountability of both groups of states to the International 
Sea-bed Authority. Non-differentiation in respect of the environmental 
protection objective of sustainable development can, however, be 
squared with the underlying rationale of common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities: Differentiated responsibilities are attributed on the basis 
of different contributions of developed and developing states to envi-
ronmental degradation and different capacities of both groups of states 
to halt environmental degradation in the future. Neither rationale is ap-
plicable in the context of the deep sea-bed mining regime. There is no 
differentiation in the responsibilities of states for the protection of the 
                                                          
85 Responsibilities Opinion, ibid., paras 123, 125-137. 
86 Responsibilities Opinion, ibid., para. 158. Para. 180 clarifies that the benefi-
ciary of the protection of the marine environment is “mankind” as much as 
it is the beneficiary of the mining activities carried out in the Area (article 
140 UNCLOS). 
87 Responsibilities Opinion, ibid., para. 157. 
88 Responsibilities Opinion, ibid., para. 163. 
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environment because deep sea-bed mineral exploitation is in fact an ac-
tivity that has no differential impact depending on who is undertaking 
it. 
The rationale of different capacities creating differentiated obliga-
tions plays out, however, in that developed states have to assist develop-
ing states through training and other means to meet their marine envi-
ronmental protection requirements. Common but differentiated re-
sponsibilities also contain the seeds for a strong consideration of equity. 
In the context of the deep sea-bed mineral exploitation, equity trans-
lates into participation in its economic benefits. This is then realised 
through the international mechanism of the International Sea-bed Au-
thority. 
4. Conclusions 
Critical parts of the law of sustainable development are built around the 
institution of responsibility. Principle No. 7 of the Rio Declaration is 
the foundational text. The foundational document is then implemented 
in the diverse issue-areas such as climate and the deep sea-bed. Across 
the variations, the core idea of Principle No. 7 is, however, borne out in 
both areas:89 each state bears reflective responsibility for the best collec-
tive protective efforts, and is accountable for its own efforts. Substan-
tive obligations can then vary depending on the status of each State 
Party as developed or developing, to the extent that this is compatible 
with the objective of protecting the global environmental good in the 
interest of humanity. 
IV. Responsibility for the Global Economy 
Despite the framework of international financial standards developed 
since the end of the Bretton Woods system, in 2008 and 2009 the world 
                                                          
89 J. Brunnée/ S. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, 2010, 
151 et seq. offer an alternative account of how the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities acquires social reality in international law. It 
is a “norm” to the extent that it is supported by resilient shared under-
standings of relevant actors and meets specified criteria of legality, general-
ity, promulgation, non-retroactivity, non-contradiction, constancy and 
predictability. 
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was engulfed in the worst economic and financial crisis since the 1930s, 
prompting a complete overhaul of the international financial architec-
ture.90 The new architecture has been grounded in responsibility with 
the Washington Declaration of the Group of Twenty as its foundational 
text.  
1. Responsibility in the G20 Washington Declaration 
The process of designing a new international financial architecture has 
been using the informal intergovernmental forum of the Group of 
Twenty (G20),91 which was originally conceived as a loose grouping 
bringing together the finance ministers and central bank governors of a 
number of leading industrialised and critical emerging economies which 
met for the first time in 1999.92 Yet in November 2008, the G20 met at 
the level of Heads of State or Government in Washington (“Leaders’ 
Summit”), producing the Washington Declaration and Plan of Action.93 
While the Washington Declaration does not expressly employ the ter-
                                                          
90 See M. Giovanoli, “The International Financial Architecture”, in: M. Gio-
vanoli/ D. Devos (eds), International Monetary and Financial Law, 2010, 
1.01. 
91 See A.S. Alexandroff/ J. Kirton, “The ‘Great’ Recession and the Emergence 
of the G-20 Leaders’ Summit”, in: A.S. Alexandroff/ A.F. Cooper (eds), 
Rising States, Rising Institutions: Challenges For Global Governance, 2010, 
193 et seq.; A.F. Cooper, “The G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee 
and/or a Contested ‘Steering Committee’ for the World”, Int’l Aff. 86 
(2010), 741 et seq. (G20 as a “steering committee” or a “crisis committee” 
for regulatory deliverables). 
92 Initially the G20 started out as the G22 and was formed for a one-time 
meeting. It briefly became the G33 and finally upon the recommendation 
of the G7 finance ministers became the G20. See P.I. Hajnal, “The G8 Sys-
tem and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation”, 2007, 151 et seq. 
Members of the G20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and 
the European Union. Spain and the Netherlands have attended as observ-
ers, as have ASEAN, the Financial Stability Board, IMF, the New Partner-
ship for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the United Nations, the IBRD 
and the WTO. 
93 Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, 
of 15 November 2008, available at <www.g20.org/Documents> (hereinaf-
ter Washington Declaration). 
Roeben, Responsibility in International Law 29 
minology of responsibility, it contains an implicit acknowledgement of 
responsibility by the G20 states. This implicit acknowledgement lies in 
the Declaration identifying past government actions and omissions as 
causative of the crisis of the financial markets and in identifying the 
need to take adequate action to prevent a recurrence of the crisis.94 The 
Declaration thereby puts in place the critical elements for shaping its 
approach to financial market regulation as a matter of responsibility. 
The Declaration identifies the public good of a functioning global fi-
nancial market and more widely of a return to growth for the interna-
tional economy. Consequences for that public good are attributed to ac-
tion taken by each participating state.95 Accountability of each of the 
participating states is established. The G20 states claim not to act (only) 
in their own interest but rather as stewards of the global financial mar-
kets and more widely the global economy.96 The Washington Declara-
tion thereby expresses that the intended beneficiary of the thus assumed 
responsibility are not just the G20 states themselves but the interna-
tional community as a whole. In 2010, the Pittsburgh Leaders’ state-
ment then made explicit what the Washington Declaration had implied: 
the G20 states self-assign themselves with responsibility for the global 
economy.97 The non-binding Washington Declaration thus puts the 
idea of responsibility at the centre of the cooperative construction of a 
new global financial architecture. The non-binding Declaration has ini-
tiated a concretising law-making process on the regulation of financial 
markets that combines the production of standards at the international 
level with their implementation at the national level. 
                                                          
94 See Washington Declaration, ibid., paras 3-7. 
95 See Washington Declaration, ibid., para. 2. 
96 See Washington Declaration, ibid., para. 1. 
97 Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit of 24-25 September 2009. The 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, Annex I, paras 
1-4: “The Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth we 
launched in Pittsburgh is the means to achieving our shared objectives. G-
20 members have a responsibility to the community of nations to assure the 
overall health of the global economy. We are committed to assess the collec-
tive consistency of our policy actions and to strengthen our policy frame-
works in order to meet our common objectives. Through our collective 
policy action, we will ensure growth is sustained, more balanced, shared 
across all countries and regions of the world, and consistent with our de-
velopment goals.” (emphasis added), (hereinafter Pittsburgh Leaders’ 
Statement) <http://www.g20.org/Documents>. 
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What follows is an analysis of the emerging oversight of a globally 
integrated financial regime and the way it concretises the idea of re-
sponsibility for the G20 states (2) and for other states (3). 
2. Designing an Oversight Regime for the Global Financial 
Markets 
The design by the G20 states of a regulatory regime for the global fi-
nancial markets is based on attribution of specific responsibilities to all 
relevant actors: the states, national regulators, and private international 
financial institutions. 
The states themselves represented by their leaders assume the re-
sponsibility to reflect on the design of the regime for the global finan-
cial markets. Through the Washington Declaration, the G20 states had 
started to sketch the future governance of the financial markets. In line 
with continuous reflective responsibility, states have kept the develop-
ment of the G20 as the core governance body under close review since 
the initial meeting in Washington. Since the initial meeting there has 
been a rapid succession of follow-up meetings of the G20 at the level of 
Heads of State or Government.98 The “summit declaration” or “leaders’ 
statement” issued by the G20 at the issue of each meeting mark the 
progress of consensus on the organisation, the principles, the instru-
ments, and the standards that should govern the cooperative enterprise, 
finally declaring the G20 the premier forum for their international eco-
nomic cooperation.99 Exercise of their reflective responsibility in this 
way by states has resulted in the design from scratch of a specific forum 
for cooperation that does not conform to existing templates. Theirs is a 
horizontal treaty-less mechanism that allows for political coordination 
                                                          
98 A second meeting took place in London in the spring of 2009, a third meet-
ing was held in September 2009 in Pittsburgh, a fourth in June 2010 in To-
ronto, a fifth in Seoul in November 2010, and a sixth in Cannes in Novem-
ber 2011. Annual meetings are envisaged thereafter. More regular meetings 
still are being held at the level of the G20 finance ministers to implement 
the agreements reached by the principals and to prepare their next meeting.  
99 Pittsburgh Leaders’ Statement, see note 97, preambular para. 19. The To-
ronto Summit Declaration of 26-27 June 2010, para. 1, states accordingly: 
“In Toronto, we held our first Summit of the G-20 in its new capacity as 
the premier forum for our international economic cooperation”, 
<http://www.g20.org/Documents> (hereinafter Toronto Summit Declara-
tion). 
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and management but also rule-making.100 Through it, states are effec-
tively accountable for their domestic financial and economic action and 
record of compliance with agreed policies to the international commu-
nity as organised in the G20.101 Action by states through the G20 must 
conform to standards and can be assessed against it. The Washington 
Declaration and subsequent summit declarations specify that regulatory 
action of the G20 will have to accord to the standards of sound regula-
tion, transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability in the sense of en-
forceability,102 and similar standards will also govern the reform of the 
international financial institutions103 and the organisation of the forum 
of the G20 itself. A standard of differentiated responsibilities does not 
feature. This reflects the assumption that effective regulation of the 
                                                          
100 As opposed to a vertical approach involving an international organisation 
such as the IMF to head the process or a Meeting of Parties to an interna-
tional treaty. See generally on government networks and their norm-
generating effects A.M. Slaughter, A New World Order, 2004. For the use 
of Meetings of Parties for international lawmaking in a range of sectors see 
V. Röben, “Conference (Meetings) of States Parties”, in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), 
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2012, vol. I, 605. 
101 Under the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) the G20 states can collec-
tively evaluate each member’s record of compliance with previously agreed 
policies and regulatory standards, Toronto Summit Declaration, see note 
99, para. 9; see IMF, Factsheet: The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process, 11 
November 2010 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts>. At the Lon-
don Summit, the G20 asked the WTO along with UNCTAD and the 
OECD to “monitor and report publicly on G20 adherence to their under-
takings on resisting protectionism and promoting global trade and invest-
ment”, Leaders’ Statement, The London Summit April 2009, The Global 
Plan for Recovery and Reform, para. 20, 
<http://www.g20.org/Documents> (hereinafter London Leaders’ State-
ment); Doc. WTO/OECD/UNCTAD, Report on G20 Trade and Invest-
ment Measures September 2009 to February 2010 of 8 March 2010, 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs>, and related Pittsburgh Leaders’ State-
ment, see note 97, para. 48. International accountability of each state is 
complemented by its national responsibility, see R.M. Nelson, “The G-20 
and International Economic Cooperation: Background and Implications 
for Congress”, Congress Research Service 1 (2010), R40977, 
<fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40977.pdf.>  
102 Washington Declaration, see note 93, para. 9; Pittsburgh Leaders’ State-
ment, see note 97, para. 5.  
103 London Leaders’ Statement, see note 101, para. 20. 
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global financial markets requires uniformity to avoid regulatory arbi-
trage.104 
Through the G20, states have contrived to set up machinery to pro-
duce policy coordination as well as financial market regulation. Ma-
nagement capacity has been complemented by rule-making capacity.105 
The machinery links political levels of decision-makers with expert-
staffed levels of decision-making, trusted with proposing and imple-
menting political decisions. At their summit meetings, leaders task fi-
nance ministers to come up with concrete proposals at the follow-up 
meeting. These are followed up by meetings of senior civil ser-
vants/regulators to further implement the political decisions into tech-
nical arrangements through standard-setting bodies susceptible of being 
applied by national authorities. Critically, regulators are addressed as 
agents having responsibilities of their own for cooperatively reaching 
certain regulatory outcomes.106 Their responsibility corresponds to 
their competence since financial regulation is still fully under the na-
tional competence of states with the exception of the European Union. 
Regulators are accountable to the G20 and receive guidance on that ba-
sis. The central forum for this cooperation is the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) set up by the G20.107 The FSB is made up of finance minis-
tries and a regulator,108 and its task is to implement the decisions taken 
                                                          
104 However, equity considerations underlie the G20-Declaration on Deliver-
ing Resources through the International Financial Institutions, providing 
for a massive increase of financial resources for the IMF and various multi-
lateral development banks, to meet the needs of emerging and developing 
countries, London 2 April 2009 <http://www.g20.org/Documents>. 
105 For an early account see D. Zaring, “International Law by Other Means: 
The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organiza-
tions”, Tex. Int’l L. J. 33 (1998), 281 et seq. 
106 Washington Declaration, see note 93, para. 8. 
107 Established at the London Leaders’ Summit of the G20, see note 101, para. 
15. The FSB was preceded by the Financial Stability Forum which was it-
self preceded by the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates, see Slaugh-
ter, see note 100, 135. The FSB has adopted a non-binding Charter to en-
hance its transparency. Cf. FSB Charter, article 1: “The Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) is established to coordinate at the international level the work 
of national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies 
(SSBs) in order to develop and promote the implementation of effective 
regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies ... ” 
108 FSB Charter, article 4: “(1) The following bodies are eligible to be a Mem-
ber: (a) National and regional authorities responsible for maintaining finan-
cial stability, namely ministries of finance, central banks, supervisory and 
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at the political level within its remit. This cyclical process will bring 
about, at the international level, internationally agreed and backed non-
binding standards for regulation. These standards will actually be trans-
lated into binding national law. While the FSB is to set new standards, 
the organisationally powerful IMF would then monitor and enforce 
compliance with them,109 even though the FSB seems to increasingly as-
sume this compliance control function itself.110 Standards may be 
agreed upon within the FSB itself or in various standard-setting bodies 
which informally report to the FSB. For instance, under the new FSB 
standards for compensation, supervisors will require that 40 to 60 per 
cent of all senior bankers’ bonuses come in the form of deferred com-
pensation over time.111 At the London Summit the G20 decided to re-
duce reliance on credit rating agencies, and the FSB responded to this 
G20 goal with Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA (Credit Rating 
Agency) Ratings,112 which were endorsed at the Seoul Summit.113 In 
addition to the FSB, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) is an important standard-setting body and venue for regulators’ 
                                                          
regulatory authorities; (b) International financial institutions; and (c) Inter-
national standard setting, regulatory, supervisory and central bank bodies.” 
For the membership of the FSB see under <http://www.financialstability 
board.org>. 
109 Washington Declaration, see note 93. 
110 There is a toolbox including peer review under the FSB’s Framework for 
Strengthening Adherence to International Standards of 9 January 2010, 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100109a.pdf.>. 
The FSB has completed its first peer review on compensation, Thematic 
Review on Compensation, Peer Review Report, March 2010 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100330a.pdf.>. 
The results feed into the regular progress reports on actions taken since the 
last summit prepared by the rotating G20 chair. 
111 The FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices and their Imple-
mentation Standards, 2 April 2009, were endorsed by the Pittsburgh Lead-
ers’ Statement, see note 97, para. 17. See L.A. Bebchuk/ J.M. Fried, “Paying 
For Long-Term Performance”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
158 (2010), 1915 et seq. (1919). 
112 FSB, Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Rating Agency (CRA) 
Ratings 27 October 2010, <http://www.financialstability 
board.org/publications/r_101027.pdf>.  
113 Leaders’ Declaration, The G20 Seoul Summit, 11-12 November 2010, para. 
37 (hereinafter Seoul Leaders’ Declaration).  
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cooperation.114 The attribution of own responsibility through the G20 
has fed into the process of national banking supervisors agreeing within 
the BCBS on the critical common standards for the equity reserves that 
banks need to hold.115 Consensus was first reached by the finance min-
isters on capital requirements for banks (Basel III), which were then 
further implemented by the Basle Committee.116 These “Basel stan-
dards” are not binding per se, but each regulator’s state is in turn re-
sponsible for implementing them internally in binding law.117 The G20 
also makes use of the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO), a network of securities’ regulators, which has come up 
with the May 2010 Principles Regarding Cross-border Supervisory 
Cooperation.118 
While these processes use the channels of regulatory rule-making by 
public authorities, the Washington Declaration enters uncharted terri-
tory by assigning private actors with direct responsibility for the inter-
national financial markets.119 The position of these private parties can 
                                                          
114 Supported by the BIS, the BCBS “generates global public goods of infor-
mation and expertise” in the area of banking supervision. It drafts stan-
dards relating to capital adequacy requirements of banks. 
115 In September 2010, the BCBS announced the international regulatory 
framework for banks (Basel III), which established a 7 per cent minimum 
common equity requirement as well as an additional counter-cyclical buffer 
including up to 2.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets (Basel III: A Global 
Regulatory Framework for more resilient Banks and Banking Systems of 
16 December 2010, <http://www.bis.org/publ/ bcbs189.pdf>). The Leaders 
Statement of the Seoul Summit, 11-12 November 2010, endorsed the Basel 
III framework. 
116 Progress Report on the Actions of the London and Washington G20 Sum-
mits, 48, 5 September 2009. 
117 Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for 
Strengthening Financial Stability, FSB of 15 February 2011, 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110219.pdf> “All 
members will now put in place the necessary regulations and/or legislation 
to implement the Basel III framework on 1 January 2013, such that it can 
be fully phased in by 1 January 2019.” The Enhancements to the Basel II 
framework, BCBS of 14 July 2009, <www.bis.org/publ/ bcbs157.htm>, 
were implemented by EU Directive 2009/111/EC, amending the “Basel II” 
or “CRD” Directive (2006/48/EC), 2009 OJ 17/9.  
118 IOSCO, Principles Regarding Cross-border Supervisory Cooperation, 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD322.pdf>. 
119 Washington Declaration, see note 93, para. 3. This entails “enhancing re-
quired disclosure on complex financial products and ensuring complete and 
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be analysed through the responsibility prism. They are thus designated 
as international moral agents that have to account for their handling of 
financial risks. They are deemed internationally accountable against 
standards being set by the G20. In subsequent steps, the G20 states 
have specified the category of private actors that bear this responsibility. 
They have created the category of Systemically Important Financial In-
stitutions (SIFIs). SIFIs will be made subject to regulation developed by 
the FSB,120 and globally systemic firms (G-SIFIs) will be made the sub-
ject of an individualised process of supervision through international 
supervisory colleges.121 
3. The G20 and the Responsibility of Third States 
The Washington Declaration constitutes an instance of self-attributed 
responsibilities by the states represented in the G20. But the London 
Leaders’ Statement also innovates by assigning responsibility for global 
financial markets to third states.122 By acting through the G20 rather 
than a more formal international organisation or a treaty with a meeting 
of parties, states had established a principle of lightly institutionalised 
harmonisation of national legislation with adherence to certain substan-
tive standards. Practice of the G20 states conforms and fleshes out this 
conceptualisation. That is also true for assigning non-traditional actors 
with international responsibility. While the G20 comprises a large 
enough portion of the world’s economy for laying down rules that will 
affect much of the global economy and have a significant compliance 
pull, a significant number of issues require action on the part of non-
represented, third states. Off-shore tax havens figure prominently here. 
Such havens are sometimes under the remit of the G20 states, but there 
are also third states. These third states are assigned responsibility exter-
                                                          
accurate disclosure by firms of their financial conditions. Incentives should 
be aligned to avoid excessive risk-taking.” 
120 The Seoul Leaders’ Declaration, see note 113, paras 30-31, 11-12 Novem-
ber 2010, endorsed the FSB’s policy framework for reducing the moral 
hazard of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). See FSB, 
“Effective Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions”, 
Consultative Document of 19 July 2011, available under 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org>  
121 Seoul Leaders’ Declaration, see note 113, para. 31. See already Declaration 
on Strengthening the Financial System, 2 April 2009. 
122 London Leaders’ Summit, see note 101, para. 15. 
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nally by the G20 states. The legitimating basis for this is the G20 claim 
to overall responsibility for the global economy, the beneficiary of 
which, in the last instance, is humanity, backed by the G20 representing 
a large share of the international economy. Concretisation of such 
third-state responsibility in binding law will still have to correspond 
with the applicable rules of the law of treaties, namely the pacta tertiis 
rule.123 States not represented at the G20 therefore have the right to de-
cide whether to enter into any bilateral or multilateral agreement pro-
posed to them. But their responsibility would mean that they are politi-
cally accountable for the position taken at the G20. In the event, bilat-
eral treaties on tax issues have been entered into by all of the said third 
states.124 
4. Conclusions 
Responsibility forms the normative core both of the established field of 
sustainable development law and of the emerging regulation of the 
global financial markets and the global economy more broadly. Both 
areas follow the matrix of responsibility for matters of concern to the 
international community. An international public good is identified, 
every state is assigned reflective responsibility, a body is identified to 
which accountability lies, which has the power of sanctioning, and 
standards of accountability are determined – effectiveness, transparency, 
equity, differentiated obligations. Private parties and third states may 
also be assigned responsibilities. 
                                                          
123 Article 34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNTS Vol. 1155 No. 
18232. 
124 See OECD, Tax-Co-operation 2009 of 31 August 2009 with press release: 
“OECD-Assessment shows bank secrecy as a shield for tax evaders coming 
to an end.” Several treaties have been concluded by the G20 members Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and the United States on the basis of the 
OECD-model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf>, drafted by OECD 
Member States and non-OECD states through the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information. See in particular: United 
Kingdom-Liechtenstein (Tax Information Exchange Agreement, 8 Decem-
ber 2008); United Kingdom-Switzerland (Swiss Federal Department of Fi-
nance Press Release, 24 August 2011); Germany-Switzerland (Press Re-
lease, 10 August 2011); United States-Switzerland (Press Release, 19 June 
2009). 
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In both areas, the matrix of international responsibility is being con-
cretised through processes of law-making grounded in a foundational 
political document which first adopts the terminology of responsibility. 
As is the case with the Rio Declaration for sustainable development, the 
Washington Declaration of the G20 is a foundational document 
adopted by a representative body of states for the regulation of the fi-
nancial markets. Each document then serves as reference point for a 
law-making process that encompasses a range of instruments of tradi-
tional treaty law – as in sustainable development – and alternative law-
making forms such as the regulatory processes pioneered in the regula-
tion of the global financial markets.125 
V. Responsibility for Peace and Stability within States 
Sustainable development and regulation of the global economy are in-
ternational goods in need of cooperative action by all or most states. 
But international responsibility also structures the governance of areas 
fully under the jurisdiction of each state, in other words: state-internal 
matters.  
1. Responsibility in the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
The 2005 World Summit Outcome126 marks the Outcome of the UN 
World Summit held in 2005, that brought together all Member States 
represented at the level of Heads of State or Government.127 The Out-
come is a resolution of the UN General Assembly and thus technically 
distinguishable from the Rio Declaration adopted by UNCED and the 
                                                          
125 On choice of instruments see generally J.H. Jackson, “International Eco-
nomic Law in Times that are interesting”, JIEL 3 (2000), 3 et seq., (8) 
(“treaties are often an awkward albeit necessary method of designing insti-
tutions needed in today’s interdependent world, but they do not solve 
many problems”); C. Lipson, “Why are some International Agreements in-
formal”, International Organizations 45 (1991), 495 et seq., (537-538) 
(benefits of informal agreements vis-à-vis treaties). 
126 The 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 of 16 September 2005 
(hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome). See generally A.M. Slaughter, 
“Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform”, 
AJIL 99 (2005), 619 et seq. 
127 A/RES/59/291 of 15 April 2005. 
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Washington Declaration adopted by the G20. But the Outcome is func-
tionally comparable to both the Rio and the Washington Declarations. 
Like those, the Outcome represents the political commitment of the 
participating states undertaken at the level of Heads of State or Gov-
ernment, expressing the intention of the international community to 
ground its future course of action in critical state-internal matters on 
the idea of responsibility.128 The critical state-internal matters addressed 
are post-conflict peace-building, basic human security – the Responsi-
bility to Protect –, and development.129 In respect of responsibilities for 
these state-internal matters, the Outcome adopts a uniform approach 
which distinguishes primary and secondary responsibilities. Primary re-
sponsibility for the public goods of development, peace and stability, 
and basic human security is attributed to each state.130 That implies its 
accountability to the international community. The international com-
munity acting through the United Nations has secondary responsibility 
that comprises a responsibility to guarantee and a responsibility to act 
preventively and responsively. This responsibilities-matrix of the Out-
come has then been concretised mainly by subsequent action of the 
                                                          
128 General Assembly resolutions may be evidence of or result in customary 
international law but do not have legal effect as such, Military and Para-
military Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), 
ICJ Reports 1986, 14 et seq. (paras 187-190); Wall Opinion, see note 21, 
para. 87. 
129 The 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, also covers a broad range 
of economic and social areas, including for instance a demand that the gov-
ernance structure of the Bretton Woods institutions include more represen-
tation from developing countries and economies in transition. This demand 
has been taken up by the G20 with respect to “emerging and developing 
economies, including the poorest countries.” Pittsburgh Leaders’ State-
ment, see note 97, para. 20, which then led to the Articles of Agreement of 
the IMF being amended in 2010, not yet in effect. 
130 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, para. 22, “We reaffirm that 
each country must take primary responsibility for its own development 
and that the role of national policies and development strategies cannot be 
overemphasized in the achievement of sustainable development. We also 
recognize that national efforts should be complemented by supportive 
global programmes, measures and policies aimed at expanding the devel-
opment opportunities of developing countries, while taking into account 
national conditions and ensuring respect for national ownership, strategies 
and sovereignty.” For reasons of space, only post-conflict peace-building 
and the Responsibility to Protect will be discussed, leaving development to 
one side. 
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principal organs of the United Nations. The following discussion of 
peace-building will in particular focus on the standards of accountabil-
ity for states (see below under 2.), while the discussion of the Responsi-
bility to Protect will demonstrate the United Nation’s own responsibil-
ity to act which must in turn not undermine the primary responsibility 
of each state for its internal affairs (see below under 3.). 
2. Post-conflict Peace-Building 
The Outcome only sketches the approach to peace-building in post-
conflict situations. It explicitly deals with the set up of a Peacebuilding 
Commission at the UN level,131 but subsequent pronouncements of the 
UN Security Council confirm that each state is primarily responsible 
for its post-conflict peace-building. 
a. Primary Responsibility of Each State Emerging from Conflict 
The UN Security Council has re-emphasised in general terms that “the 
primary responsibility for peace-building lies with governments and 
relevant national actors, including civil society, in countries emerging 
from conflict.”132 Primary responsibility ensures national ownership of 
any peace-building processes.133 Beyond peace-building after conflict, 
the Security Council has extended the reach of the principle to all in-
stances in which internal peace and stability of a state is in question. 
                                                          
131 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, para. 97, “Emphasizing the 
need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict 
peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace, 
recognizing the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the 
special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reinte-
gration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for 
sustainable development, and recognizing the vital role of the United Na-
tions in that regard, we decide to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as 
an intergovernmental advisory body.” See also Explanatory note on the 
Peacebuilding Commision, Secretary-General, Doc. A/59/2005/Add. 2. 
132 SC Presidential Statement, para. 2, Doc. S/PRST/2011/2; SC Presidential 
Statement, para. 4, Doc. S/PRST/ 2011/4. 
133 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, para. 5, refers to self-
determination, and the reference to self-determination must be understood 
as constituting both the ground of the primary responsibility of each state 
and the limit to the possible role of the international community in pre-
scribing standards for the conduct of state internal affairs. 
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This is demonstrated by the case of Cyprus. In respect of the ongoing 
division of the country, the Security Council has emphasised that “the 
responsibility for finding a solution to the internal conflict” lies primar-
ily with the state (of Cyprus).134 By the same token, this state is ac-
countable to the international community pursuant to certain stan-
dards, concerning, for instance, the conduct of negotiations.135 The 
United Nation’s role is to support these negotiations.136  
b. The United Nations as Addressee of Accountability of States 
By virtue of being the primarily responsible actor, each state is account-
able for the consequences of its action for internal peace and stability. 
That accountability lies towards the United Nations. Within the United 
Nations, competence for post-conflict peace-building is asserted to lie 
with the Security Council by virtue of Article 24 UN Charter, with the 
Security Council interpreting the controlling term “international peace 
and security” to extend to achieving sustainable peace after a country 
emerges from conflict.137 The vantage point from which the United Na-
tions approach the internal organisation of a state is the impact that this 
organisation has on the state’s internal stability, and, by ramification, in-
ternational stability.138 Demands are formulated to ensure that a state is 
stable and internally peaceful rather than become a failed state or a pa-
                                                          
134 S/RES/1986 (2011) of 13 June 2011 preambular para. 3 “Echoing the Secre-
tary-General’s firm belief that the responsibility for finding a solution lies 
first and foremost with the Cypriots themselves ...” 
135 Ibid., paras 1-10. 
136 Ibid., preambular para. 3 “... reaffirming the primary role of the United 
Nations in assisting the parties to bring the Cyprus conflict and division of 
the island to a comprehensive and durable settlement.” 
137 SC Presidential Statement, Doc. S/PRST/2011/4 para. 1 “The Security 
Council reaffirms its primary responsibility under the Charter of the 
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security and 
its readiness to strive for sustainable peace in all situations under its consid-
eration.” 
138 Identified threats to global stability will justify and require concerted ef-
forts of a legislative and administrative nature by both states and the Secu-
rity Council. Terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
have been identified as such global stability risks, for the former see 
S/RES/1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, for the latter see S/RES/1540 
(2004) of 28 April 2004. 
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riah state.139 There is also growing understanding that representative 
state organs are essential to the successful development of developing 
states, and as such form the legitimate objective of strategic efforts of 
the international community.140 As expressed in a number of recent 
general statements by the Security Council, achieving state-internal sta-
bility requires “representative institutions” that ensure that, as a mini-
mum, rulers have the consent of the governed and that internal and 
communal conflicts can be successfully and peacefully mediated.141 
On that basis, the Security Council concretises the accountability of 
each state emerging from conflict through criteria for the internal or-
ganisation of these states. The said Presidential statements have been 
followed up by mandatory Security Council action based on UN Char-
ter Chapter VII. A democratic state organisation based on elections 
marks one end of the organisational spectrum,142 which starts, at the 
                                                          
139 Joint Article on Libya: the pathway to peace, Prime Minister Cameron and 
President Obama, <http://www.number10.gov.uk>.  
140 See World Bank, World Development Report 2011. International efforts 
should be directed towards building government institutions in states 
which can mediate political and communal conflicts. The report acknowl-
edges that there is not one single form or template for democracy, and that 
in each case, a culturally acceptable form must be found. 
141 SC Presidential Statement, Doc. S/PRST/2011/2, para. 1 “The Security 
Council restates the previous Statements of its President on post-conflict 
peacebuilding. The Council stresses the importance of institution building 
as a critical component of peacebuilding and emphasizes the importance of 
a more effective and coherent national and international response to it, so 
that countries emerging from conflict can deliver core government func-
tions, including managing political disputes peacefully, providing security 
and maintaining stability, protecting their population, ensuring respect for 
the rule of law, revitalising the economy and providing basic services, 
which are essential to achieving durable peace. The Council emphasizes the 
importance of national ownership in this regard”; SC Presidential State-
ment, para. 3, Doc. S/PRST/2011/4 “The Security Council reiterates that, 
in order to support a country emerge sustainably from conflict, there is a 
need for a comprehensive and integrated approach that incorporates and 
strengthens coherence between political, security, development, human 
rights and rule of law activities.” 
142 A state’s opting for democracy will receive a positive assessment from the 
Council, an expression of support, and even the indication of positive 
measures that the Council and the UN Member States should take in sup-
port of national efforts, S/RES/1944 (2010) of 14 October 2010. For previ-
ous practice see N. Petersen, Demokratie als teleologisches Prinzip, 2009. 
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other end, with minimum standards for collective decision-making, “in-
stitution building” and representation of traditionally under-
represented groups such as women and minorities.143 Territorial inter-
national administration in post-conflict situations by the United Na-
tions has consistently been directed toward establishing democratic 
governance structures.144 There is also rich practice of the Security 
Council operationalising the peaceful exercise of any self-determination 
claims in the colonial and in the non-colonial contexts through criteria 
for the domestic structures of the new states typically emerging from 
conflict.145 In a non-colonial context, the proper representation of any 
group bearer of the right to self-determination within a state’s govern-
ance institutions will realise that group’s “internal” self-determination, 
foreclosing the group’s rights to “external” self-determination through 
secession. If the case so warrants, the Security Council can move from 
establishing standards for internal peace-building processes to address-
ing any factors that might stand in the way or hinder their implementa-
tion by deploying a variety of instruments including targeted measures 
(individual sanctions) and forcible measures under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.  
For that purpose, a situation internal to a state can be determined to 
constitute a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion” within the meaning of Article 39 UN Charter, clearing the 
threshold for forcible and non-forcible measures under Chapter VII, 
Arts 41-42. This template is now being established by the Security 
Council through its recent action e.g. regarding the Ivory Coast. This 
state has been emerging from a civil conflict; there has been a third-
party brokered peace process, which includes presidential and parlia-
mentary elections. S/RES/1962 sets forth the critical considerations that 
will justify measures of the Council under Chapter VII on the situation 
in that state.146 S/RES/1975 protects the outcome of the presidential 
                                                          
143 Cf. S/RES/1820 (2008) of 19 June 2008, op. para. 11 (standards to ensure 
the representation of women as a matter of internal peace). 
144 See R. Wolfrum, “International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations 
by the United Nations and Other International Actors”, in: A. v. Bog-
dandy/ R. Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck UNYB 9 (2005), 649 et seq. 
145 See U. Saxer, Die internationale Steuerung der Selbstbestimmung und der 
Staatsentstehung, 2010; M. Benzing, “Midwifing a New State: The United 
Nations in East Timor”, Max Planck UNYB, see note 144, 295 et seq. 
146 S/RES/1962 (2010) of 20 December 2010, preambular paras 2-4 “Congratu-
lating the Ivorian people for the holding of the two rounds of the Presiden-
tial election on 31 October 2010 and 28 November 2010 with a massive and 
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elections, through binding requests addressed to the main players.147 It 
urges the defeated incumbent to immediately step aside and condemns 
him for not accepting the overall political solution proposed by the 
High-Level Panel put in place by the African Union.148 Beforehand all 
Ivorian state institutions, including the armed forces, were urged to 
yield to the authority vested by the Ivorian people in the newly elected 
President.149 S/RES/1980, preambular para. 5, then welcomes the fact 
that the elected President has taken office in accordance. 
The Council also put so-called targeted sanctions in place to support 
implementation of the peace process and the elections.150 This sanctions 
regime is specifically to serve stabilisation throughout the country, the 
holding of the parliamentary elections and the implementation of the 
key steps of the peace process.151 The implementation of these measures 
                                                          
peaceful participation. Condemning in the strongest possible terms the at-
tempts to usurp the will of the people and undermine the integrity of the 
electoral process and any progress in the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Expressing grave concern at the risk of escalation of violence, recalling that 
the Ivorian leaders bear primary responsibility for ensuring peace and pro-
tecting the civilian population in Côte d’Ivoire and demanding that all 
stakeholders and parties to conflict act with maximum restraint to prevent 
a recurrence of violence and ensure the protection of civilians.” The moti-
vation as well as the robustness of the measures taken by the Council here 
closely resemble those under Responsibility to Protect. 
147 S/RES/1975 (2011) of 30 March 2011. 
148 Ibid., op. para. 3 
149 S/RES/1962 (2010) of 20 December 2010, op. para. 1. 
150 Ibid. op. para. 16: “Reaffirms its readiness to impose measures, including 
targeted sanctions, against persons who, among other things, threaten the 
peace process and national reconciliation, including by seeking to under-
mine the outcome of the electoral process, obstruct the work of UNOCI 
and other international actors and commit serious violations of human 
rights and international humanitarian law, as set out by Resolution 1946 
(2010).” S/RES/1980 (2011) of 28 April 2011, op. para. 1 renews the tar-
geted sanctions under Chapter VII directed against individuals.  
151 See in this respect S/RES/1962, see note 149, op. para. 8 “Stresses the im-
portance of UNOCI’s continued support to the Ivorian peace process in 
accordance with its mandate, especially the completion of the unfinished 
tasks including the legislative elections, ..., the strengthening of rule of law 
institutions, the reform of the security sector, and the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights with particular attention to the situation of chil-
dren and women.” 
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is backed up by available military means.152 The Council took forcible 
measures under UN Charter Chapter VII when the defeated incumbent 
resorted to force against the newly elected president.153 Any measures 
taken by the Council on that basis remain, however, within the ration-
ale of primary responsibility of the state concerned.154 The United Na-
tions also recognises that it has a critical own role to play in support of 
building countries’ national institutions.155 One important instrument 
is the Peacebuilding Commission established by concurrent General 
Assembly and Security Council resolutions, which also established a 
Peacebuilding Fund and a Peacebuilding Support Office.156 That this 
involvement is again complementary to the primary responsibility of 
each state is implied, for instance through the composition of the Peace-
Building Commission.157  
                                                          
152 Ibid., op. para. 14 “Recalls its authorization given to UNOCI to use all 
necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its ar-
eas of deployment.” 
153 S/RES/1975, see note 147, op. para. 6, “Recalls its authorization and 
stresses its full support given to the UNOCI, while impartially implement-
ing its mandate, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to pro-
tect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capa-
bilities and its areas of deployment, including to prevent the use of heavy 
weapons against the civilian population and requests the Secretary-General 
to keep it urgently informed of measures taken and efforts made in this re-
gard.” 
154 S/RES/1980, see note 150, preambular para. 4 “Emphasizing the continued 
contribution to the stability in Côte d’Ivoire of the measures imposed by 
resolutions 1572 (2004), 1643 (2005) and 1975 (2011) and stressing that 
these measures aim at supporting the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire.” (em-
phasis added) 
155 SC Presidential Statement, para. 4, Doc. S/PRST/2011/4 of 11 February 
2011. 
156 S/RES/1645 (2005) of 20 December 2005; A/RES/60/180 of 20 December 
2005. 
157 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, paras 97-105. The purpose of 
the Peacebuilding Commission is to bring together all relevant actors to 
marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for 
post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery (para. 98). 
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3. The “Responsibility to Protect” 
It would not seem to be a controversial statement that international law 
considers the security of civilian populations to be covered by the sov-
ereignty of each state understood as objective competence and subjec-
tive right. Correspondingly, the UN’s main concern had traditionally 
been with the security of states in their international relations. But the 
atrocities committed against civilian populations in Rwanda and on the 
Balkans in the 1990s caused basic human security in each state to arise 
as a concern for the international community.158 By developing the “re-
sponsibility to protect” the 2005 World Summit Outcome established 
as an international public good the protection of civilian populations 
from four crimes and violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity.159 In respect of this objective, the Out-
come assigns states and the international community with responsibili-
ties. It is the responsibility of “each individual state” to protect its 
populations from the four crimes,160 including their prevention.161 Pro-
                                                          
158 See reports in relation to the Rwandan genocide Doc. S/1999/1257 and the 
fall of Srebrenica Doc. A/54/549. 
159 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, at paras 138-139. For forerun-
ners, cf. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
The Responsibility to Protect, 2001; High-level Panel on Threats, Chal-
lenges and Change, A more secure World – Our shared Responsibility, Doc. 
A/59/565 of 2 December 2004; Report of the UN Secretary-General, In 
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for 
All, Doc. A/59/2005 of 21 March 2005. There is a burgeoning literature, to 
which is cited throughout this portion of the article. 
160 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, para. 138: “Each individual 
State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility 
entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act 
in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, 
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the 
United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.” 
161 This language fits into the threefold standard of human rights and humani-
tarian obligations to “respect, protect and fulfil”, cf. UN Human Rights 
Committee, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant, General Comment No. 31, Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 of 26 May 2004; cf. A. Peters, “The Responsi-
bility to Protect: Spelling out the Hard Consequences for the UN Security 
Council and its Members”, in: U. Fastenrath et al. (eds), Essays in Honour 
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tection from the four crimes is a universal standard, applying to all UN 
Member States. But in respect of the objective of civilian protection, the 
Outcome also identifies an own responsibility of the international 
community to act preventively and responsively through the United 
Nations.162 The Outcome is a politically binding instrument adopted 
by the General Assembly at the level of Heads of State or Government. 
It has been followed up by normative activity of the UN principal or-
gans under the UN Charter, ranging from the Secretary-General’s re-
port to the General Assembly on “Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect”163 and an extensive General Assembly debate164 to UN Secu-
rity Council measures binding under UN Charter Chapter VII.165 This 
                                                          
of Bruno Simma, 2011, 297 et seq. On the threefold human rights standard 
see generally W. Kälin/ J. Künzli, The International Law of Human Rights 
Protection, 2010, 96 et seq. 
162 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, para. 139: “The international 
community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accor-
dance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect popula-
tions from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against hu-
manity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a 
timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance 
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in co-
operation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing 
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly 
to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its 
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and interna-
tional law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropri-
ate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to as-
sisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.” 
163 Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Pro-
tect, Doc. A/63/677 and related A/RES/63/308 of 14 September 2009, para. 
1. “Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General and of the timely and 
productive debate organized by the President of the General Assembly on 
the responsibility to protect, held on 21, 23, 24 and 28 July 2009, with full 
participation by Member States; 2. Decides to continue its consideration of 
the responsibility to protect.” 
164 Doc. A/63/PV.99. 
165 The 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly. As the United Nations is based on coordinated princi-
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organisational secondary law-making concretises the Responsibility to 
Protect along the general matrix of international responsibility. Build-
ing on a multi-level governance model, primary responsibilities of each 
state and secondary responsibilities of the United Nations for the pro-
tection of civilians are demarcated, duties and possible sanctions for 
their non-fulfilment are determined, and lines of accountability are es-
tablished. 
a. Primary Responsibility of Each State to Protect Civilians from 
Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes against 
Humanity 
The Secretary General’s report on implementation offers a conceptual 
clarification of the 2005 World Summit Outcome’s Responsibility to 
Protect concept by distinguishing a three Pillar strategy: Pillar one 
comprises the protection responsibilities of the state, Pillar two the in-
ternational assistance and capacity-building, and Pillar three timely and 
decisive response. The three Pillars mark functions that are assigned to 
states and the United Nations. Each state is assigned with the Respon-
sibility to Protect its civilian populations from the four crimes, this 
overall responsibility of each state is primary over the secondary re-
sponsibility of the United Nations.166 This backs up the assertion that 
Responsibility to Protect is no distraction from but rather presupposes 
sovereignty.167 Guaranteeing each state the space for own protective ac-
tion is indeed a necessary prerequisite for attributing the consequences 
of its decisions to it. Each state is accountable for its decisions to the in-
ternational community which will assess them against internationally 
defined criteria. The 2005 World Summit Outcome already identifies 
the broad standard to prevent the commission of the four crimes. This 
universal standard, applying to all UN Member States, is in need of fur-
ther concretisation.  
                                                          
pal organs (Article 7 UN Charter) this resolution would not per se be bind-
ing on, in particular, the Security Council to the extent that this body bears 
“primary responsibility” for international security and world peace. The 
Council has, however, referred to the concept itself, absorbing it into its 
own practice, comprising general re-statements of the law and forcible and 
non-forcible measures pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Perti-
nent Council resolutions will be discussed subsequently. 
166 Report, see note 163, para. 14. 
167 Ibid., para. 10 (“responsible sovereignty”). 
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In a first step, the standard is backed up and fleshed out by relevant 
international treaty law, which needs to be faithfully embodied in na-
tional legislation.168 The Genocide Convention e.g. establishes the 
threefold obligation for States Parties to prevent genocide169 and to 
punish individuals for its commission170 (obligation to protect) as well 
not to actively commit genocide through its own organs or actors it 
controls (obligation to respect). In respect of war crimes, the Geneva 
Conventions also impose obligations of respect and protection includ-
ing prevention.171 Crimes against humanity are punishable individual 
offences under international criminal law, and respective obligations for 
states are laid down in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribu-
nals and of the ICC.172 Further concretisation of the protective stan-
dard is the province of the United Nations. The Secretary-General’s re-
port specifies the protection responsibilities of the state.173 Significantly, 
UN Security Council resolutions under UN Charter Chapter VII have 
defined specific standards for states to meet their protective responsibil-
ity. The Security Council did so in S/RES/1674 on the protection of ci-
vilians in armed conflict174 and in S/RES/1882 on the topic of children 
and armed conflict.175 These resolutions set forth general restatements 
of the law, but add that states need to comply with them as an expres-
sion of their responsibility. 
                                                          
168 Ibid., para. 17. 
169 Article I; cf. further Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia 
and Montenegro), ICJ Reports 2007, 43 et seq. (221, para. 430) (due dili-
gence obligation to prevent the extraterritorial commission of genocide) 
(hereinafter Genocide Convention case).  
170 Article I; and Genocide Convention case, see above, 226, para. 439.  
171 Wall Opinion case, see note 21, paras 158-159 (duty for states to ensure re-
spect for common article I of the Geneva Conventions regardless of 
whether they are parties to a specific dispute including other states).  
172 Cf. A. Cassese/ G. Acquaviva/ M. Fan/ A. Whiting, International Criminal 
Law, 2011 (ethnic cleansing is not a defined crime under international 
criminal law). 
173 Report, see note 163, paras 14-22. 
174 S/RES/1674 (2006) of 28 April 2006, op. para. 4 reaffirmed paras 138 and 
139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, see note 126. This re-
affirmation was recalled in S/RES/1706 (2006) of 13 August 2006.  
175 S/RES/1882 (2009) of 4 August 2009, preambular para. 3 “Stressing the pri-
mary role of national Governments in providing protection and relief to all 
children affected by armed conflicts.” 
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b. The Responsibility of the United Nations to Guarantee and to 
Act 
The UN’s own Responsibility to Protect civilians is secondary to each 
state’s primary responsibility. The United Nations must therefore not 
substitute itself for the choices of each state. But it must also be able to 
take action to ensure that the state discharges this responsibility within 
the standards applicable. The United Nation’s responsibility comprises 
two elements, a responsibility to guarantee and a responsibility to act.  
The 2005 World Summit Outcome establishes the United Nations as 
the body to which each state is accountable for discharge of its protec-
tive responsibility. Assuming this role of accountability body is the re-
sponsibility of the United Nations. It thus has the responsibility to 
guarantee that states fulfil their primary responsibility. For that purpose 
the United Nations may progressively develop standards, assess per-
formance against these standards, and for that purpose it may take ob-
servational action through its own organs and other organs. The United 
Nations may, as a consequence of its assessment, take enforcement ac-
tion. Sanctionability of assessments is inherent to the idea of account-
ability. In the case of accountability of a state to an international organi-
sation, the sanctionability of assessments becomes a question of the 
competences of the organisation. The United Nations can assess the 
failure of a state to meet its protection responsibility and take action on 
the basis of Charter Chapter VII with the dual objective of directly 
protecting civilians and indirectly sanctioning the government for its 
failure. A government that has been found manifestly to fail the Re-
sponsibility to Protect-test may be presumed to have lost the consent of 
the governed and will eventually have to step aside.  
It is a consequence of the forceful statement in the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome, para. 139, that the United Nations has not only the 
responsibility to guarantee but also has responsibility to act. The own 
responsibility of the United Nations to act extends to assistance and re-
sponse action, that is Pillar 2 and 3 in the terminology of the Secretary-
General’s Implementation report. On the basis of UN Charter Chap-
ters VI and VIII, the United Nations will take action through its own 
organs aimed at preventing crises from arising in the first place includ-
ing establishing an early warning facility.176 The international commu-
nity, acting through the United Nations, must be ready to build capac-
ity to prevent any of the four crimes being committed and to assist in 
                                                          
176 Report, see note 163, paras 28-39 
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situations of stress. Pillar 3 is timely and decisive response and it is 
again the responsibility of the United Nations.177 Responsive action by 
means of Security Council measures pursuant to Chapter VII UN 
Charter may take place in the case of a “manifest failure” on the part of 
the state to fulfil its responsibility where a crisis could not be pre-
vented.178 The range of means includes military force.179 The objective 
of such preventive and responsive action by the United Nations can, 
however, only be restitution of the state-internal political process, in 
other words the primary responsibility of the state.  
In particular the Security Council has substantially added to the le-
gal concretisation of the Responsibility to Protect, namely by referring 
to it in resolutions adopted under Chapter VII, authorising forcible 
measures concerning the situations in Libya and in the Ivory Coast. In 
the Libyan situation, the Security Council has invoked the Responsibil-
ity to Protect in its resolution S/RES/1973 adopted under Chapter VII, 
which authorises the deployment of “all necessary measures” by Mem-
ber States to protect civilians in Libya from the large-scale use of force 
by the Libyan government.180 Security Council action further concre-
tises the individual criminal responsibility of the Libyan leadership by 
referring the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the ICC.181 In the 
Ivorian situation, invocation of a Responsibility to Protect civilians and 
human rights has motivated the authorisation of a UN force and the 
French troops supporting it to use “all necessary means” to protect ci-
vilians from the use of force by the defeated incumbent president’s 
forces.182 The Ivorian intervention thus pushes the boundaries of possi-
ble UN Security Council action through the direct authorisation of 
peacekeepers as a result of a state’s government failure to fulfil its pro-
                                                          
177 Ibid., paras 49-67. 
178 The Council may intervene at an early point to prevent a crisis from esca-
lating, cf. Report, see note 163, para. 11 lit. (c) (referring to Council in-
volvement in Kenya after disputed elections pursuant to SC Presidential 
Statement, SCOR 60th Sess., 5831st Mtg, Doc. S/PRST/2008/4 of 6 Febru-
ary 2008).  
179 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, para. 139 “should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to pro-
tect their populations ...” 
180 S/RES/1973 (2011) of 17 March 2011. 
181 S/RES/1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011, op. paras 4-8. 
182 See text at notes 146 et seq. 
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tective responsibilities.183 In these instances, the Security Council has 
invoked the state’s Responsibility to Protect for motivating its measures 
under Chapter VII. This practice of the Security Council concretises 
the Responsibility to Protect into secondary (Council) but also primary 
(Charter) law.  
Three functions of the Council’s referral to the Responsibility to 
Protect have to be distinguished. First, there is the level of the Charter 
itself. Responsibility presupposes competence to act. Do the United 
Nations and in particular the UN Security Council have the compe-
tence to respond to a state failing to protect its populations by taking 
over the protection task? The UN Charter entrusts the Security Coun-
cil with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of “international 
peace and security”, and for that purpose the Security Council under 
Chapter VII UN Charter has powers to take decisions that are legally 
binding on all members of the organisation.184 But does this denote the 
competence of the UN Security Council to take forcible measures in re-
spect of what is essentially a state-internal situation? It first offers a 
general interpretation of the criterion “any threat to the peace” that Ar-
ticle 39 UN Charter establishes as a threshold for any Security Council 
action under Chapter VII.185 In other words the Responsibility to Pro-
                                                          
183 S/RES/1962 (2010) of 20 December 2010 recalls that the Ivorian leaders 
bear primary responsibility for ensuring peace and protecting the civilian 
population in Côte d’Ivoire. S/RES/1975 of 30 March 2011 preambular 
para. 9 contains recognition of the responsibility to protect civilians: “... re-
affirming the primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians and 
reiterating that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to 
take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians and facilitate the 
rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of 
humanitarian personnel ...” 
184 In addition to its power to repel threats to international peace and security, 
the Security Council has assumed (quasi-)legislative powers in areas as di-
verse as anti-terrorism and non-proliferation, see G. Abi-Saab, “The Secu-
rity Council as Legislator and Executive in its Fight Against Terrorism and 
Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Question of 
Legitimacy”, in: R. Wolfrum/ V. Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International 
Law, 2008, 109 et seq. 
185 The Council had acted essentially in internal situations before, Somalia be-
ing a case in point, S/RES/794 (1992) of 3 December 1992, op. para. 10, cf. 
further C.E. Philipp, “Somalia – A Very Special Case, Cross Cutting Is-
sues”, Max Planck UNYB, see note 144, 517 et seq. But the Responsibility 
to Protect provides a general rationale for acting in internal situations. The 
Council is thus interpreting the threshold criterion of “international peace 
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tect clarifies that the commission of any of the four crimes in a state per 
se can constitute a “threat to the peace”. Responsibility to Protect here 
drives the legal development at the level of the treaty. Second, Respon-
sibility to Protect is of relevance in determining the exercise of that 
power by the Security Council. In other words, Responsibility to Pro-
tect serves to guide the exercise of the discretion that the Security 
Council enjoys under Chapter VII, Arts 41 and 42 (“may”). The mo-
ment that the Council recognises that Responsibility to Protect is im-
plicated in a given instance, however, accountability of the Council is 
established. The Security Council then assumes the burden of argumen-
tation as to whether an intervention to protect civilians is required. 
Third, Responsibility to Protect is grounded and limited to what the 
Council can do in individual instances. Its responsive action in pursuit 
of Responsibility to Protect must not arrogate the primary responsibil-
ity of each state to protect its populations through means of its free 
choosing. Council action must not go further than restoring a state of 
affairs where the state concerned can again assume its primary respon-
sibility. Interpretation of the Charter and each resolution adopted un-
der Chapter VII must comply with this understanding. Fourth, inter-
vention of the UN Security Council in Member States in pursuit of the 
Responsibility to Protect requires observance of an inclusive procedure 
by the Council involving the regional context of the state deemed to be 
violating its primary protective responsibilities.  
The 2005 World Summit Outcome already refers to legitimacy of 
the Council as depending on procedural inclusiveness,186 and the Secu-
rity Council envisages that its procedure will have to involve any re-
gional security system concerned.187 Chapter VIII UN Charter indeed 
provides for regional systems of collective security to prevent regional 
crises, bring them to the Council’s attention, and to carry out measures 
authorised by the Council.188 The Security Council has explicitly men-
                                                          
and security” in a general fashion, akin to an exercise of legislative power. 
On such legislation on the level of the primary UN Charter see M. Wood, 
The UN Security Council and International Law, 2006; Namibia Opinion, 
see note 21, para. 22.  
186 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, para. 154. 
187 See S/RES/1809 (2008) of 16 April 2008. 
188 UN Charter, Arts 52-53, provide that crises shall be dealt with at the re-
gional level to the extent possible. According to Article 52 (2) UN Charter 
Member States of the UN shall make “every effort to achieve pacific set-
tlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such 
regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.” Corre-
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tioned the referral of the situation in Libya by the Arab League pursu-
ant to its Charter as one of the grounds justifying Resolution 1973.189 
And in the case of the Ivory Coast, the Council has referred to action of 
the African Union requesting that state’s government to respect its fun-
damental norms. The Security Council then took these references into 
account, triggering action by it under Chapter VII.190 
The UN Security Council is responsible for its preventive and re-
sponsive action. The 2005 World Summit Outcome recognises the re-
sponsibility not just of the international community but implicitly that 
of the Security Council as well, and this is made explicit in the Secre-
tary-General’s Implementation report and has been acknowledged in 
Security Council practice. Accountability of the Security Council lies 
with the UN General Assembly as the body representative of UN 
membership as a whole. This accountability is of a political nature. In 
other words, the Security Council can be held to account politically by 
the General Assembly, which may define political criteria. Responsibil-
ity to Protect itself would be the most important criterion for the exer-
cise of the Council’s powers under Chapter VII, even though further 
more detailed criteria for consistent action would be needed.191  
                                                          
spondingly, Article 52 (3) UN Charter obliges the Security Council to “en-
courage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through 
such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the ini-
tiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council”. 
Article 53 UN Charter even envisages that the competent regional organi-
sation may carry out enforcement action upon authorisation by the UN 
Security Council. 
189 S/RES/1973, see note 180, preambular para. 12. 
190 The controlling terms of these provisions make reference to international 
situations. However, in parallel to the threshold contained in Article 39 
UN Charter, the relevant criteria in Arts 52 and 53 UN Charter are open to 
being interpreted as encompassing the state-internal situations involving 
the Responsibility to Protect. Such interpretation of Arts 52 and 53 may be 
inferred from the Security Council accepting referrals by regional security 
systems to it of instances of state-internal unrest and use of force against 
civilians. 
191 Report, see note 163, para. 62, and In Larger Freedom, see note 159, para. 
126. See J. Brunnée, “International Law and Collective Concerns: Reflec-
tions on the Responsibility to Protect”, in: T. Malick Ndiaye/ R. Wolfrum 
(eds), Liber amicorum Judge Thomas Mensah, 2007, 35 et seq. (43-48), (dis-
cussing negotiating history).  
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In addition to this role as addressee the General Assembly is a re-
sponsible actor itself both under the second and the third Pillar.192 The 
General Assembly has indeed become active through the Human 
Rights Council. Membership of this subsidiary organ of the General 
Assembly depends on a state’s human rights record. And on that basis, 
the Council has been supporting and supplementing Security Council 
interventions in Libya193 and in Ivory Coast.194 
c. Responsibility of Each State Represented on the Governance of 
United Nations Organs 
The collective responsibility of the international community and of the 
UN principal organs does not preclude that it be further broken down 
to individual states represented on the governance of these organs. This 
first of all concerns the 15 UN Member States represented in the UN 
Security Council at any one time but particularly the 5 permanent 
members. Complementing the powers of UN Security Council mem-
bership with the duty to exercise these in a certain way would be in 
tune with the idea of responsibility.195 But it would need further au-
thoritative recognition. The 2005 World Summit Outcome document 
only established the responsibility of the international community for 
responding to a state’s failure to meet its primary protective responsibil-
ity through the Security Council.196 But the Secretary-General’s report 
                                                          
192 The General Assembly’s peace and security functions are addressed in UN 
Charter Arts 11, 12, 14, and 15. 
193 A/HRC/RES/S-15/1 of 25 February 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011) of 26 Febru-
ary 2011 preambular para. 5 “Welcoming the Human Rights Council reso-
lution A/HRC/RES/S-15/1 of 25 February 2011, including the decision to 
urgently dispatch an independent international commission of inquiry to 
investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to establish the facts and circumstances of such 
violations and of the crimes perpetrated, and where possible identify those 
responsible.” 
194 A/HRC/16/25 in connection with S/RES/1975 (2011) of 30 March 2011. 
195 And more broadly solidarity, L. Boisson de Chazournes, “Responsibility 
to Protect: Reflecting Solidarity?”, in: R. Wolfrum/ C. Kojima (eds), Soli-
darity: A Structural Principle of International Law, 2010, 93 et seq. 
196 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, para. 139: “timely and decisive 
manner ... on a case-by-case basis ...”. This preparedness is conditioned on 
a manifest failure of the state to protect, the inadequacy of peaceful means, 
respect of the Charter law, and cooperation with relevant regional organi-
sations as appropriate. 
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suggests that each state represented on the Security Council and in par-
ticular that each permanent member has an own responsibility and 
“should” consider the use of the veto in instances where the Responsi-
bility to Protect is manifestly implicated.197 While the General Assem-
bly has not yet given authoritative recognition to individual responsi-
bility qua Security Council membership,198 as permanent members the 
United States and the United Kingdom have accepted this responsibil-
ity incumbent on them qua membership of the Council in a joint state-
ment at the level of Heads of State and Government.199 It is, further-
more, only consequent that their individual protective responsibility 
also attaches to membership in the UN General Assembly.200 
                                                          
197 Report, see note 163, para. 61: “Within the Security Council, the five per-
manent members bear particular responsibility because of the privileges of 
tenure and the veto power they have been granted under the Charter. I 
would urge them to refrain from employing or threatening to employ the 
veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the re-
sponsibility to protect, as defined in paragraph 139 of the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome document, and to reach a mutual understanding to that 
effect.” 
198 A/RES/63/308 of 14 September 2009 “takes note of the report of the Secre-
tary-General.”  
199 Joint Statement of Prime Minister Cameron and President Obama: “We are 
reluctant to use force but when our interests and values come together we 
know that we have a responsibility to act. This is why we mobilised the in-
ternational community to protect the Libyan people from Colonel Gad-
dafi’s regime”, see note 141. These states assume a responsibility to act for 
the benefit of the population of the state concerned while a secondary 
beneficiary may be their own population. On the legal qualification of joint 
statements see Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v. Turkey), ICJ 
Reports 1978, 3 et seq. (para. 98); Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation 
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 
ICJ Reports 1994, 112 et seq. (para. 26); Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), ICJ Judgment of 20 April 2010, 
paras 128, 149, < http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf>.  
200 Report, see note 163, para. 61: “... All Member States, not just the 15 mem-
bers of the Security Council, should be acutely aware of both public expec-
tations and shared responsibilities. If the General Assembly is to play a 
leading role in shaping a United Nations response, then all 192 Member 
States should share the responsibility to make it an effective instrument for 
advancing the principles relating to the responsibility to protect expressed 
so clearly in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome.” 
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4. Conclusions 
The international responsibility for post-conflict peace-building and the 
Responsibility to Protect from the crimes of genocide, war crimes, eth-
nic cleansing and crimes against humanity is grounded in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome. In respect of these state-internal matters, 
starting from a multi-level global governance model comprising states 
and international organisations, each state, the United Nations, and 
states represented on the governance structure of the United Nations 
are conceived of as actors to whom responsibilities ought to be attrib-
uted in such a way that the common objective be best achieved. The po-
litically binding 2005 World Summit Outcome has then been concre-
tised through secondary law-making by the UN principal organs 
namely the UN Security Council. The Security Council has underlined 
the primary responsibility of each state for internal peace and stability. 
The United Nations have secondary responsibility only. But Security 
Council measures also establish that by virtue of its primary responsi-
bility each state is accountable pursuant to criteria set by it. In terms of 
the criteria that states have to meet, there is a powerful trend requiring 
states to secure internal peace and stability through representative insti-
tutions. A state’s responsibility will also involve assessment by the 
Council of whether the state has effectively complied with the criteria. 
The UN Security Council assesses the internal situation of states from 
an early point on when a crisis threatens to develop, formulating view-
points and issuing decisions as appropriate. As a crisis evolves, there 
then arises a point when the UN Security Council may take responsive 
action under Chapter VII UN Charter. Post-conflict peace building and 
the Responsibility to Protect overlap here as the UN Security Council 
will invoke the state’s Responsibility to Protect in either case to justify 
resort to forcible measures. But the United Nations is not free in its ac-
tions either. Rather it is responsible itself to the international commu-
nity, in particular as to whether it will itself take collective protective 
action as consequence of the manifest failure of the primarily responsi-
ble territorial state. An own responsibility of states serving on the gov-
ernance structure of the United Nations is also emerging. That is true 
particularly for the members of the UN Security Council in the exercise 
of their special powers. 
Responsibility for post-conflict peace-building and the Responsibility 
to Protect converge. Both concepts involve the definition, imposition of 
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standards for the institutional set-up of the state,201 the assessment of 
whether standards have been met, and the sanctionability of the assess-
ment. 
The idea of responsibility powerfully structures the approach of the 
international community to state-internal matters relevant for interna-
tional peace and stability and the protection of civilians but this objec-
tive is its ground and its limit. The reach of the institution of responsi-
bility is thus not automatically congruent with community interests 
protected by erga omnes or ius cogens norms. United Nations practice 
on post-conflict peace-building and the Responsibility to Protect dem-
onstrates that responsibility remains a concept that the United Nations 
has been careful to reserve for the internal matters considered to be 
most significant for global stability. While international law contains a 
host of legally binding human rights norms, the international institu-
tion of responsibility for them has not yet been extended to them.  
Through the appropriate normative processes, there may, however, 
be constituted international responsibility for human rights protection 
along the lines of the matrix of responsibility for state-internal matters. 
That this may come to pass in the future is indicated by certain pro-
nouncements of the United Nations that each state is responsible for 
the protection of human rights. Also, there is currently no international 
responsibility for individual states to ensure respect of human rights 
obligations in another state generally. International law at this juncture 
does not provide for the requisite comprehensive powers for states to 
enforce another state’s human rights obligations. The 1948 Genocide 
Convention obligates States Parties to prevent the extraterritorial com-
mission of genocide, but that would not confer a right to intervene in 
another state.202  
There are also only limited powers for states to act under the cus-
tomary international law of state responsibility. A state that is not mate-
                                                          
201 The 2005 World Summit Outcome, see note 126, paras 119-145, discusses 
the Responsibility to Protect together with democracy and the rule of law 
in its section dealing with human rights. 
202 Genocide Convention case, see note 169, para. 430 (“A State does not incur 
[state] responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved; 
[state] responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to 
take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power ... The 
State’s capacity to influence must also be assessed by legal criteria, since it is 
clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by interna-
tional law.”). 
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rially injured by another state violating its multilateral treaty obliga-
tions can require cessation. Reparation must be tended to the entire 
group of states to which the obligations are owed.203 In the human 
rights context, reparation can be made only once for the benefit of the 
individuals concerned. Even to the extent that international human 
rights norms constitute ius cogens, a state is limited to non-recognition 
and invoking other states’ obligation to cooperate to remove the conse-
quences of the breach of the ius cogens norm.204 A state may also resort 
to judicial enforcement, seeking a declaration that another state has vio-
lated its obligations under the applicable human rights treaty.205 The 
powers that accrue to states in respect of the human rights obligations 
incumbent on other states remain limited,206 there is currently no basis 
for an attribution of the consequences of ongoing human rights viola-
tions in other states. This particularly clearly demonstrates the function 
of the institution of responsibility to concretise norms into doctrine 
and to link this doctrine with enforcement machinery. 
VI. Responsibility as an Institution of International Law: 
Concluding Reflections  
The institution of international responsibility underlies much of the 
most dynamic law of the international community. The critical idea is 
to identify international public goods for which each state and any 
competent international organisation ought to be assigned responsibili-
ties. Responsible actors would be accountable to designated bodies for 
                                                          
203 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, see 
note 13, article 48. The law of state responsibility attaches “legal conse-
quences” to the breach by a state of any obligation under international law 
binding on that state provided there are no circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness. The resulting secondary obligations for that state comprise 
cessation of the violation and/or making reparation for it. 
204 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, see 
note 13, article 41. 
205 Many UN human rights treaties contain a clause conferring jurisdiction on 
the ICJ, see Case Concerning Application of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Rus-
sian Federation), see note 68. 
206 On non-forcible intervention in other states’ domestic affairs see L.F. Dam-
rosch, “Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influ-
ence over Domestic Affairs”, AJIL 83 (1989), 1 et seq. 
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controlling consequences of their action for these goods, and account-
ability would be assessed against standards and can be sanctioned. Safe-
guarding such international public goods must benefit the international 
community as a whole. They fall broadly into one of two groups. There 
are those of a transjurisdictional or global nature requiring cooperation 
between states. Others are under the jurisdiction of each state. Stan-
dards of accountability vary accordingly. This matrix of international 
responsibility acquires legal reality through a dynamic law-making 
process that concretises political commitments into binding law leading 
to enforceable doctrine. The process involves characteristic stages: a 
foundational document grounds the approach of the international 
community to a new field or area of responsibility. This foundational 
document is political in nature but it typically carries the legitimacy of 
having been adopted by the domestically responsible Heads of State or 
Government. The foundational reference text is then concretised 
through an iterative law-making process that involves, as sources of law, 
classic treaties as well as alternatives to treaty making including the sec-
ondary law of international organisations. The institution of interna-
tional responsibility sits at the centre of some of the most dynamic ar-
eas of contemporary international law. Climate change regulation is 
based on common but differentiated responsibilities for sustainable de-
velopment, the regulation of the international financial market is based 
on the G20 responsibility for the global economy, state-internal peace 
and security is based on the responsibility to secure lawful stability, and 
the protection of civilians is founded on the responsibility to protect. 
Seen together, these reference areas reflect the importance, the contours, 
and the functions of responsibility as an institution of the law of the in-
ternational community. Critical among these functions is to help con-
cretise broad norms into doctrine and to link this doctrine with an en-
forcement machinery. Understood as an institution, responsibility can 
indeed deliver a single concept encompassing the various senses in 
which the form is used in international law and international law doc-
trine. It encompasses the senses of competence, obligation and liability. 
Identifying international responsibility as an institution of international 
law allows understanding in what ways international law has been 
evolving. The emergence of an institution of responsibility is a central 
marker for the underlying shift in the fundamental function of interna-
tional law from serving sovereigns pursuing their national interests to 
serving the pursuit of common objectives and community interests. 
The institution will identifiably remain distinct from its implementa-
tion. In other words, the implementation at any one time does not ex-
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haust the meaning of the institution. There is a residual normative con-
tent of which several effects can be identified: first, the institution com-
prises only a segment of international law differentiating it from other 
parts, giving it identity and aiding in the interpretation of individual 
norms. Second, the institution allows us normatively to link disparate 
developments in the law, to see their interconnectedness, and thus al-
lowing the systemic study of new functionalities in the existing law. 
Third, it may serve to evaluate legal developments, becoming a catalyst 
for the development of new law shaped by, reflecting the set of ideas 
behind the institution, and justifying the rolling out of a regulatory 
framework to improve on the present state of things. Finally, seen 
against the background of responsibilities states attribute to themselves 
or which are attributed to them, the classic consent rationale justifying 
international law commitment loses importance. The institution of re-
sponsibility itself includes a reference to a meta-basis of obligation. This 
is a basis of obligation not grounded in consent in the sense that there is 
no free disposition about the obligations to be incurred. This article 
points to the process of negotiating, entering into and complying with 
internationally legally binding commitments. Rather states have to be-
come engaged in the process. 
